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I. INTRODUCTION: THE “SPAGHETTI BOWL” CRISIS
The global trading community is in a state of deep crisis. Its main
system, multilateralism, has recently been clogged by viscous trade barriers
created by a proliferation of bilateral, regional trading blocs. Globalization
offers a worldwide “production value chain” which enables even small
economies to take part in the global commerce by offering raw materials or
labor. In fact, small economies hold a comparative advantage at certain
stages of the international manufacturing process.1 However, the current
pattern of regional trading blocs militates against such participation by
erecting new barriers against non-members and thus compartmentalizing
the global market.2 This is not what globalization and free trade are meant
to be.
It is the contention of this article that the current proliferation of
regional trade agreements (“RTAs”)3 has disrupted the original equilibrium
between multilateralism (globalism) and regionalism that was established in
the 1940s under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).4
In the absence of such equilibrium, world trade becomes fragmented. Such
fragmentation ultimately impedes the fulfillment of the raison d’être of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”): the simultaneous promotion of free
trade, adequate regulation, and development.5 To remedy this crisis, the
previous equilibrium must be restored by defragmenting world trade
through both institutional and judicial strategies.
More RTAs have been created under the WTO, which has existed for a
little over a decade, than were created during the half-century existence of

1

Victor Fung, Bilateral Deals Destroy Global Trade, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at 13,
available at http://www.ft.com/home/us (search for “Bilateral Deals Destroy Global Trade”;
then follow “COMMENT: Bilateral deals destroy global trade” hyperlink).
2
Id. See also Victor Mallet & Anna Fifield, APEC Admits Dangers of Bilateral Deals,
FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2005, at 7 (quoting Sergio Garcia de Alba Zepeda), available at
http://www.ft.com/home/us (search for “APEC Admits Dangers”; then follow
“INTERNATIONAL NEWS: Apec admits dangers of bilateral deals” hyperlink).
3
In this article, RTA is used as a generic term connoting both free trade areas and
customs union under GATT Article XXIV.
4
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-7, 55 U.N.T.S. 187
[hereinafter GATT].
5
Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1140, 1144–53 (1994) [hereinafter WTO
Agreement].
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GATT, its predecessor.6 Nowadays, more than half of all global trade is
performed within these blocs.7 Since these RTAs are preferential and
discriminatory by nature, their unchecked multiplication seriously
fragments world trade by attacking the Most-Favored-Nation (“MFN”)
principle, which is the backbone of the multilateral trading system.
Moreover, those RTAs tend to hijack the current WTO Doha Round
negotiation by depriving poorer WTO Members of deserved attention and
limited resources.8
Granted, RTAs are not entirely without merits. They can complement
the multilateral trading system. In fact, Article XXIV of GATT endorses
them as a facilitator of international trade.9 One might reasonably speculate
that because regional blocs have far fewer participants than the WTO (at
nearly 150 members and counting), bloc members can engage in more
flexible and effective negotiations on trade liberalization.10 Also, with
smaller numbers of members, RTAs might experiment with various
regulatory standards.11 These merits are conceivable as long as the
complementarity test is met under GATT Article XXIV, and therefore the
original equilibrium between regionalism and globalism is maintained.
However, the current form of regionalism, which may be termed “NeoRegionalism” for its characteristically unprecedented ubiquity and intensity,

6

CONSULTATIVE BOARD TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL, THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:
ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 21 (Jan. 17, 2005),
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf [hereinafter
CB Report].
7
See Ken Heydon, Regionalism: A Complement, Not a Substitute, in REGIONALISM AND
THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM 11, 12 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development 2003) [hereinafter OECD, REGIONALISM].
8
ROBERT SCOLLAY, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPOSAL FOR A FREE TRADE
AREA OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC (FTAAP): AN ISSUES PAPER FOR THE APEC BUSINESS ADVISORY
COUNCIL (ABAC) 32, http://www.apec.org.au/docs/koreapapers2/SX-RS-Paper.pdf (last
visited Jan. 17, 2005).
9
GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV, para. 4 (as amended by Special Protocol relating to
article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, signed at Havana, on 24
March 1948, GATT/1/162/ 24 March 1948, available at http://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/
English/SULPDF/90310346.pdf) (“The contracting parties recognize the desirability of
increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary agreements, of closer
integration between the economies of the countries parties to such agreements. They also
recognize that the purpose of a customs union or of a free-trade area should be to facilitate
trade between the constituent territories and not to raise barriers to the trade of other
contracting parties with such territories.” (emphasis added)).
10
WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: OVERVIEW AND GLOBAL OUTLOOK vii
(2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2005/Resources/gep2005.
pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS].
11
See generally Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier Between Regionalism and
Multilateralism: A New Perspective on Trade Regionalism, 42 HARV. INT’L L. J. 419, 429–
36 (2001) [hereinafter Cho, A New Perspective].
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is in fact replacing, not complementing, the multilateral trading system.
Regional trading blocs have become the “standard” of international trade,
not the complementary vehicle.12 Therefore, the original equilibrium
between regionalism and multilateralism has been broken, and this broken
equilibrium has in turn brought critical consequences to the global trading
system.
First of all, the “spaghetti bowl” of mushrooming mercantilist blocs
under Neo-Regionalism ultimately results in Least-Favored Nation
treatment superseding the Most-Favored-Nation principle of multilateralism
in the global context.13 While those blocs may facilitate intra-bloc trade,
they stress the global trade by raising new barriers to extra-bloc trade and
disassociating a bloc from the rest of the world due to its preferential
nature. Moreover, in many cases even intra-trade liberalization remains
limited because certain sectors are insulated from open trade. These sectors
are often simply excluded from the coverage of RTAs or otherwise
protected through complicated rules of origin. Thus, RTAs tend to
“institutionalize” protectionism.14
A recent surge of RTAs also precipitates regulatory failure. Many
social charters in RTAs are not only inconsistent with WTO norms but also
cause regulatory gridlock in the global context.15 Certain recent bilateral
deals have managed to dilute the multilateral disciplines on public health by
inserting WTO-plus provisions on trade and intellectual property rights.16
In addition, such regulatory heterogeneity itself is a serious trade barrier.
Multiple regulations over the same subject matter are simply at odds with
the globalized production system. A patchwork of regulatory regimes
increases transaction costs for global business.
Finally, those RTAs between the rich and the poor under which the
former plays a hub and the latter a spoke may bring developmentally
negative consequences to the latter. These hub-and-spoke model RTAs
tend to serve the economic interests of the hub to the detriment of the
spoke, especially when sensitive products on which the spokes hold
comparative advantages are excluded from the coverage of these RTAs. A
recent World Bank report warns that bilateral trade deals decrease the
wealth of most poor countries, while a multilateral trading agreement could
enrich both rich and poor nations.17 A simulation in the report demonstrates
that if all developing countries sign bilateral trade agreements with
developed countries, low income countries’ real income would actually
12
13
14
15
16
17

42

See Fung, supra note 1.
CB Report, supra note 6, at 19.
See Evdokia Moïsé, Rules of Origin, in OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 161.
See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
See Trade Policy: Exclusive, ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 2004, at 78 [hereinafter Exclusive].
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shrink by 1.0% over the next decade.18
Admittedly, RTAs are often suffused with political considerations that
may prevail over the aforementioned concerns of economic policy.19 Under
such non-economic considerations, GATT Article XXIV could serve
trading nations’ political needs for regionalism and thus demonstrate its
“political savvy.”20 However, history eloquently attests that attempts to
rationalize regionalism based on political contemplation are fatally flawed.
The current Neo-Regionalism is reminiscent of the interwar prevalence of
regionalism over multilateralism. In the 1930s, regional trading blocs were
mobilized for cut-throat mercantilist competition, which shrunk world trade
nearly 70% and further deepened the Great Depression worldwide.21 This
regionalism-cum-mercantilism eventually contributed to the outbreak of
World War II (“WWII”).22
Seventy years later, the United States and the European Union are
reenacting their interwar mercantile rivalry by rushing to form preferential
blocs (European Union and Free Trade Agreement of the Americas), rather
than pursuing multilateral trade liberalization.23 Paul Krugman has
observed that an even worse outcome for the multilateral trading system
could occur should a third East Asian bloc emerge and further fragment the

18

See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 10, at xvi.
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 423–29 (discussing varying origins of
economic regionalism and pertinent empirical observations). See also John Redmond,
ASEAN in a World of Trade Blocs: Pacific Integration in the Asia-Pacific, in REGIONAL
TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM, AND THE GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS TO FREE
TRADE? 170 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996) [hereinafter COMPLEMENTARY
PATHS] (“[T]he Asia-Pacific lacks the unifying factors that were present in Western Europe
in the post-Second War period―a desire for peace, as well as the need to contain Germany
and to check the Soviet threat. This has left regional integration in the Asia-Pacific with a
lack of purpose and enfeebled the process.”).
20
Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored
Nation Obligation and Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON.
27, 50 (1996).
21
See Edward C. Luck, American Exceptionalism and International Organization:
Lessons from the 1990s, in U.S. HEGEMONY AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE
UNITED STATES AND MULTILATERAL INSTITUTIONS 25, 39 (Rosemary Foot et al. eds., 2003)
(quoting remarks by the former U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky on U.S.
trade policy and the WTO on Mar. 2, 2000). See also Patrica Clavin, The Triumph of
Regionalism over Globalism: Patterns of Trade in the Interwar Period, in COMPLEMENTARY
PATHS, supra note 19, at 31–33.
22
See Dennis Kennedy, Regional Trading Blocs, Multilateralism and the New GATT
Agreement: An Introduction, in COMPLEMENTARY PATHS, supra note 19, at 1 [hereinafter
Introduction]; Clavin, supra note 21, at 33.
23
See Richard H. Steinberg, Great Power Management of the World Trading System: A
Transatlantic Strategy for Liberal Multilateralism, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 205, 255
(1998).
19
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global trading system.24 To that extent, the specter of a return to the
destructive regionalism of the Thirties remains.
Against this backdrop, this article serves two purposes. First, it aims
to amplify the chorus of alarms emanating from a number of sources,
including the recent WTO Consultative Board (“CB”) Report.25 The article
is a timely effort to raise the warning level about the damaging effects of
regionalist fragmentation on the global trading system. Second, this article
endeavors to overcome some of the shortcomings of the existing literature
in this field. Most studies of regionalism have been rather case specific,
focusing on individual RTAs, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement (“NAFTA”), and the Southern Common Market
(“MERCOSUR”) and the European Union.26 A consolidated balance sheet
of regionalism and multilateralism does not appear in any of these case
specific studies.
Furthermore, much of the existing literature has been written by
economists.27 Although economic analysis may supply an empirical basis
for the understanding of RTAs,28 it generally fails to provide legal analysis
24

ROBERT SCOLLAY & JOHN P. GILBERT, NEW REGIONAL TRADING ARRANGEMENTS IN THE
ASIA PACIFIC? 6 (2001).
25
See generally Sungjoon Cho, The Future of the WTO: Report by the Consultative
Board, ASIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2005, http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/01/insight050131.htm.
26
See, e.g., FREDERICK M. ABBOTT, LAW AND POLICY OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE
NAFTA AND WESTERN HEMISPHERIC INTEGRATION IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
SYSTEM (1995); Ana Maria de Aguinis, Can MERCOSUR Accede to NAFTA?: A Legal
Perspective, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 597 (1995); Meinhard Hilf, The ECJ’s Opinion 1/94 on the
WTO―No Surprise, but Wise?, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L 245 (1995); Pieter J. Kuijper, The
Conclusion and Implementation of the Uruguay Round Results by the European Community,
6 EUR. J. INT’L L 222 (1995); David Lopez, Dispute Resolution Under MERCOSUR from
1991 to 1996: Implications for the Formation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas, 3-SPG
NAFTA: L. & BUS. REV. AM. 3 (1997); Stephen P. Sorensen, Open Regionalism or OldFashioned Protectionism?: A Look at the Performance of MERCOSUR’s Auto Industry, 30
U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 371 (1998).
27
See, e.g., JEFFREY A. FRANKEL, REGIONAL TRADING BLOCS IN THE WORLD ECONOMIC
SYSTEM (1997); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM (Edward D. Mansfield & Helen
V. Milner eds., 1997); RICHARD POMFRET, THE ECONOMICS OF REGIONAL TRADING
ARRANGEMENTS (1997); SCOLLAY & GILBERT, supra note 24; Jagdish Bhagwati,
Regionalism Versus Multilateralism, 15 WORLD ECON. 535, 544–45 (1992) [hereinafter
Bhagwati, Regionalism]; Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, CGE
Modeling and Analysis of Multilateral and Regional Negotiating Options, (Univ. Mich. Sch.
of Pub. Policy, Discussion Paper No. 468, 2001); Jacques J. Polak, Is APEC a Natural
Regional Trading Bloc?: A Critique of the ‘Gravity Model’ of International Trade, 19
WORLD ECON. 33 (1996).
28
See, e.g., Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, Multilateral,
Regional, and Bilateral Trade-Policy Options for the United States and Japan (Univ. Mich.
Sch. of Pub. Policy, Discussion Paper No. 490, 2002) (finding that regional blocs are inferior
to the WTO trade rounds in creating economic welfare); Exclusive, supra note 17, at 78
(quoting the recent World Bank report showing that regional deals have contributed to global
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anchored by the purpose and objective of the multilateral trading system.
Just as the integrationist telos of the WTO serves as an ultimate
hermeneutical criterion for the interpretation of various trade rules,29 it can
offer a normative litmus test with which to assess the negative effects of
fragmentation which Neo-Regionalism may inflict on multilateralism. In
this regard, this article highlights certain teleological failures caused by
regionalist fragmentation and proposes both institutional and judicial means
to defragment world trade.
Part II begins by highlighting the paradoxical nature of regional blocs:
their effect may be centripetal, i.e., integrating, among their members, but
centrifugal, i.e., disintegrating, to non-members. It then documents how the
original equilibrium between these regional blocs and the multilateral
trading system has been broken under current manifestations of NeoRegionalism.
Part III builds on this background by probing the damages in which the
broken equilibrium results, i.e., regionalist fragmentation. First, a tripartite
telos of the modern multilateral trading system: free trade, regulatory
harmonization, and development is adopted as an investigatory criterion.
This criterion is then applied to the current regional trading blocs in order to
confirm that these blocs hinder and impede the fulfillment of the tripartite
telos.
A wholesale elimination of regional trading blocs is neither a realistic
nor a desirable option. RTAs die hard for political reasons and are also
useful under certain circumstances. Therefore, the only solution for the
WTO is to restore the original equilibrium of complementarity by
defragmenting the status quo, i.e., multilateralizing the current
configuration of RTAs. In this vein, Part IV suggests two defragmenting
strategies. The first strategy features various “institutional” reforms, such
as an “open regionalism” under which regional trade liberalization can be
shared with non-members, regulatory convergence under the WTO and
through international standards, and a monitoring mechanism for RTAs.
The second strategy recognizes that institutional reforms require a certain
degree of political support that is not necessarily in existence at the present
time. In fact, political needs for regionalism may resist such reforms.
Under these circumstances, both regional and WTO tribunals can contribute
to defragmentation of world trade through judicial intervention to steer
regional trade policies in the firm direction of multilateralism. For instance,
regional trade tribunals may interpret RTA texts in a way that is consistent
tariff cutting only by 10% between 1983 and 2003).
29
See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp
and Shrimp Products, ¶¶ 146–60, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/distab_e.htm (invoking the WTO’s objective of
“sustainable development” in interpreting a vague language of GATT Article XX).
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with the WTO Agreement under a constructive hermeneutics analogous to
the Charming Betsy doctrine.30
Finally, Part V concludes that the defragmentation of world trade
would result in a “federalistic” reconfiguration of regional trading blocs in
the constitutional terrain of the multilateral trading system. This federalistic
order derives not merely from an economic formula of a Vinerian test, but
more from the very telos of the multilateral trading system, i.e., an
“integrated, more viable, and durable” system,31 under which the tripartite
mission of trade, regulation, and development is implemented.
II. THE EQUILIBRIUM BETWEEN REGIONALISM AND
GLOBALISM
A. The Disintegrationist Nature of Regionalism
Regionalism, on account of its inward looking nature, exhibits
disintegrationist features vis-à-vis the rest of the world in its design as well
as its operation. Although a regionalist project, be it a free trade area or a
customs union, is driven by an integrationist ethos in a regional dimension,
it is eventually disintegrationist in the sense that it discriminates against
those non-members excluded from such a project. In other words, the
parochial bond among RTA members, which is backed by exclusive trade
preferences, not only distances these members from non-members, but also
brews tensions between members. History provides empirical confirmations
of this preposition.
In Europe, regionalist projects often assumed a nation building
mission. For instance, the Deutscher Zollverein, one of the earliest regional
initiatives, established a customs union among eighteen small German
states in 1834.32 In 1871, it expanded to include Alsace-Lorraine.33 With
the encouragement of Prussian leadership under Chancellor Otto von
Bismarck, the Deutscher Zollverein became an underpinning of the
Deutsches Reich.34 Although these regional integration projects contributed
greatly to the emergence of nation states, their exclusive and mercantilist
nature concurrently split Europe and subsequently pitted one against
another in the colonialist competition, which climaxed into World War I
(“WWI”).35 Fierce rivalry among European imperialist powers, which

30

See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
WTO Agreement, supra note 5, at 1144.
32
See generally WILLIAM O. HENDERSON, THE ZOLLVEREIN (1939).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See ANDREW PORTER, EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM 1860–1914 (1994); see also ALAN
HODGART, THE ECONOMICS OF EUROPEAN IMPERIALISM (1978).
31
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precipitated the “Scramble for Africa,” is considered as one of the main
culprits behind the outbreak of WWI.36
However, old habits die hard. After an evanescent globalism after
WWI, the world once again fell to the destructive pattern of regionalism.
During the interwar period, major powers, such as the United Kingdom,
France, and the United States, competitively formed preferential trading
blocs, which some argue contributed to the deepening of the Great
Depression,37 together with the notorious Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of
1930.38 The interwar global economic balkanization eventually split the
world into haves, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and
have-nots, such as Germany, Italy, and Japan, which formed an “Axis”
among themselves.39 This series of unfortunate events contributed to the
outbreak of WWII.40 It was not until the end of WWII that nations realized
how damaging regionalism can be. This realization was reflected in the
creation of GATT, a multilateral architecture of the international trade
system, and in particular, GATT Article XXIV.
B. The Original Equilibrium between Regionalism and Globalism under
GATT Article XXIV
Although regionalism was widely condemned as one of the major
contributing factors to two tragic wars in the twentieth century, its political
resiliency was still salient even after the end of WWII. For instance, the
United Kingdom wished to sustain the pre-war “Commonwealth
preferences” despite the U.S. master globalization plan.41 Moreover,
although many former colonies began to become independent in the postwar milieu, both former colonizers and colonies maintained their strong
bonds, particularly in economic relationships.42 Even the United States saw
the need to foster a strategic regionalism in Europe in order to reconstruct
the continent and check the expansionist Soviet communist regime.43
36

See generally THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA: THE WHITE MAN’S
CONQUEST OF THE DARK CONTINENT FROM 1876 TO 1912 (1st ed. 1991).
37
See Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner, The New Wave of Regionalism, 53 INT’L
ORG. 589, 597 (1999).
38
Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 1304–1681b
(2000)).
39
See Introduction, supra note 22; Clavin, supra note 21.
40
See Clavin, supra note 21.
41
See JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 576–77 (1969)
[hereinafter JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT].
42
For instance, the European Community signed a comprehensive preferential trade
agreement in 1975 (The Lomé Convention) with its former colonies in Africa, Caribbean,
and Pacific region and has regularly renewed it ever since. See Joseph L. Brand, The New
World Order of Regional Trading Blocks, 8 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 155, 158–60 (1992).
43
JACKSON, THE LAW OF GATT, supra note 41, at 576–77.
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Those varying strategic calculations left an indelible relic of regionalism in
the post-war architecture of the global trading system.
Against this backdrop, GATT Article XXIV44 was provided as a
compromise between globalist ideals and regionalist realities. The Article
endorses the formation of free trade areas and customs unions, as long as
they would “facilitate,” not undermine, global trade.45 This equilibrium
enabled by GATT’s conciliatory stance on regionalism was justified on
economic grounds. In his seminal work, The Customs Union Issue, Jacob
Viner introduced two different economic effects of regional trading blocs:
an integrationist, centripetal effect (trade creation) and a disintegrationist,
centrifugal effect (trade diversion).46 Viner implied that RTAs might be
desirable, as long as the trade creating effect is more influential than the
trade diverging one.47
The structure of GATT Article XXIV echoes Viner’s insight.
Paragraph 4 of the Article, while acknowledging the “desirability of
increasing freedom of trade by the development, through voluntary
agreements, of closer integration,” nonetheless emphasized that RTAs
should “facilitate trade between the constituent territories and not to raise
barriers to the trade of other contracting parties with such territories.”48 In
this line, the Article stipulated internal (Paragraph 8), external (Paragraph
5), and procedural (Paragraph 7) requirements that any RTA should meet to
be permitted under GATT. Paragraph 8 provides that “substantially all the
trade” between/among the constituent territories should be liberalized.49
Paragraph 5 provides that post-formation incidences of duties and other
44
45
46

GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV.
Id. art. XXIV, para. 4.
JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOM UNION ISSUE 44–45 (1950). Viner observed that:
Where the trade-creating force is dominant, one of the members at least must
benefit, both may benefit, the two combined must have a net benefit, and the world
at large benefits; but the outside world loses, in the short-run at least, and can gain
in the long-run only as the result of the general diffusion of the increased
prosperity of the customs union area. Where the trade-diverting effect is
predominant, one at least of the member countries is bound to be injured, both may
be injured, the two combined will suffer a net injury, and there will be injury to the
outside world and to the world at large. The question as to what presumptions can
reasonably be held to prevail with respect to the relative importance in practice of
the two types of effects will be examined subsequently.

(emphasis added).
47
Id. But see Introduction, supra note 22, at 2 (criticizing that Viner’s theory ignored the
gains from economies of scale and changes in the terms of trade as well as the potential gain
through increased economic growth and foreign competition within a customs union).
48
GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV, para. 4.
49
Id. art. XXIV, para. 8.
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trade restrictions vis-à-vis non-members should not be higher than those at
the preformation stage. Paragraph 7 provides that GATT should be
promptly notified of any plan to launch an RTA for the sake of transparency
and further deliberation. To the extent that RTAs satisfy all of these
requirements, they are deemed “building blocks,” and not “stumbling
blocks” to the multilateral trading system.50 Therefore, the original
equilibrium struck between RTAs (regionalism) and GATT (globalism) is
that the former are supposed to “complement but [can]not substitute” the
latter.51
C. The Equilibrium Maintained: Regionalism under GATT (1947–1994)
Early records of post-war regionalism were hardly impressive in
economic terms.52 Over-politicized rhetoric, ranging from anti-colonialism
in Latin America to security alliances in South East Asia, prevailed over
economic rationale in the Sixties and Seventies.53 RTAs such as the Latin
American Free Trade Association (“LAFTA”),54 the North Atlantic Free
Trade Area,55 and the Association of South East Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”),56 which were created against this political backdrop,

50
This catchy phrasing was invented by Bhagwati and popularized by Lawrence. See
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AT RISK 77 (1991) [hereinafter
BHAGWATI, AT RISK]; FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 209; Robert Lawrence, Emerging
Regional Arrangements: Building Blocks or Stumbling Blocks?, in FINANCE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 22–35 (Richard O’Brien ed., 1991).
51
OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 3.
52
See BHAGWATI, AT RISK, supra note 50, at 71.
53
See Bhagwati, Regionalism, supra note 27, at 538–39.
54
In 1960 the Treaty of Montevideo launched the Latin American Free Trade
Association (“LAFTA,” “ALALC” in Spanish) to remove trade barriers between the member
states over a 12 year period. The Treaty of Montevideo of 1980 restructured the Association,
creating as its successor the Latin American Integration Association (“ALADI”). See
Organization of American States (“OAS”), Foreign Trade Information System, An Analytical
Compendium of Western Hemisphere Trade Arrangements: General Overview,
http://www.sice.oas.org/cp061096/english/01010100.asp#ala (last visited Mar. 27, 2005).
55
The North Atlantic Free Trade Area has recently been reincarnated as the
“Transatlantic Economic Partnership.” See generally Ellen L. Frost, The Transatlantic
Economic Partnership (Inst. for Int’l Econ. Pol’y Brief 98–6, Sept. 1998),
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb.cfm?ResearchID=85 (providing an overview of the
Transatlantic Economic Partnership).
56
ASEAN was created in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and
Thailand, and then expanded to include Brunei Darussalam (1984), Vietnam (1995), Laos
and Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999). See The Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) Overview, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm. From its inception, ASEAN
has focused on a political, rather than economic, agenda—namely regional peace and
security—in the era of decolonization and the Cold War. See Mark Beeson, ASEAN plus
Three and the Rise of Reactionary Regionalism (2003), available at
http://eprint.uq.edu.au/archive/00000496/01/mbasean03.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2004). Its
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demonstrated little economic success.57 In Latin America, ideological
narratives were more controlling in shaping the contour of regionalism.58 In
Asia, the Cold War paternalism by the United States, together with other
sociocultural factors, discouraged regional economies from forming formal
RTAs.59 The European Community (“E.C.”) certainly stands as an
institutional emphasis on political cooperation initially prioritized political values, such as
sovereign independence and non-interference, over economic values, such as market
integration and interdependence. Id. It was not until 1992 that ASEAN members established
a free trade area amongst themselves. Southeast Asia: A Free Trade Area,
http://www.aseansec.org/viewpdf.asp?file=/pdf/afta.pdf (last visited Dec. 24, 2004). As a
trade liberalizing enterprise, ASEAN’s performance has been lackluster. ASEAN members,
which are mainly developing countries, prefer an incremental liberalization and market
opening strategy. See Thomas C. Fischer, A Commentary on Regional Institutions in the
Pacific Rim: Do APEC and ASEAN Still Matter?, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 337, 353
(2003).
57
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 427–28.
58
In Latin America, a backlash against imperialism among newly independent countries
led to an inward-looking development strategy, particularly the domestic production of basic
consumer goods as a substitute for importation or “import substitution.” JAMES M. CYPHER &
JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 174–75 (1997). In this setting,
intra-regional trade liberalization was necessary to generate certain economies of scale to
offset the market miniaturization inherent in inward-looking strategies. See Jason R. Wolff,
Putting the Cart Before the Horse: Assessing Opportunities for Regional Integration in Latin
America and the Caribbean, 20-SPG FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 103, 106 (1996). Influenced
by this economic ideology, numerous regional trade agreements were initiated in the 1960’s,
including: the LAFTA (1960), the Central American Common Market (“CACM”) (1960),
and the Andean Pact (1969). Id.
59
This institutional deficiency is attributable to a number of factors, which are mostly
histo-political. Ever since the Western imperialist powers marched into Asia armed with
superior technology provided by the Industrial Revolution, the region became a forum for
power struggles and wars. Asia’s colonial experiences, deep-rooted resentment from
numerous wars, and diverse cultures arising from different ethnicities and languages, may
explain the scarcity of formal arrangements in this region. Paul M. Evans, Regional
Institutions, Regional Identities, in EASTERN ASIA: AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY 451–58
(Colin Mackerras ed., 3d ed. 2000). Thus, as Robert Scalapino hinted, an “Asianization”
process might be a formidable task. Robert A. Scalapino, Regionalism in the Pacific:
Prospects and Problems for the Pacific Basin, 26 THE ATL. COMT. Q. 174, 178 (1988)
(defining “Asianization” as a “widening and deepening network of ties between and among
Asian states of diverse political and cultural nature”). Another reason for the weak
regionalism in Asia may be close bilateral economic partnerships between the United States
and Asian countries. In the post-war period, the United States was steadfastly committed to
Asia because of its status as a main architect of the post-war economic order and as a
champion of Western capitalism. The United States provided major export markets for Japan
and “Newly Industrialized Economies” (“NIEs”),” i.e. Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong,
and Taiwan. It even provided these countries with preferential market access, as seen in the
Generalized System of Preferences (“GSPs”). Major East Asian countries’ economic
reliance on the United States might have obviated any need to form regional blocs. This lack
of formal regional institutions has led East Asian countries to integrate themselves into the
global market more vigorously. A weak trade regionalism has been funneled into a strong
commitment to the multilateral trading system, such as the old GATT 1947 and the WTO.
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exception to this general trend. The E.C. project flourished as its internal
market was gradually integrated and subsequently revitalized Member
States’ economies.60 Overall, until the Eighties, regionalist activities were
spasmodic, at least in the economic sense.
However, the shaky progress of the Uruguay Round (“UR”)
negotiations in the late Eighties began to stir up regionalist sentiments
worldwide. In North America, the United States departed from its longstanding multilateralist commitment by forming regional trading blocs with
neighboring trading partners. It first entered into the U.S.–Canada Free
Trade Agreement (“CUSFTA”),61 which was subsequently expanded to
include Mexico and renamed NAFTA.62 In South America, another

See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND DEEPER INTEGRATION
(1996). The NIEs could prosper by adopting outward-looking, export-oriented development
strategy, as opposed to the import-substitution strategies adopted by Latin American
countries during the same period. More recently, China has transformed its economy from an
old Cold War hermit to a new globalizer. Ever since it adopted the “Open Door” policy in
the late 1970’s, it has dramatically integrated its ever-expanding economy into the
mainstream of the global market system, which recently culminated in its admission to the
WTO. See Frederick M. Abbott, Reflection Paper on China in the World Trading System:
Defining the Principles of Engagement, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING
THE PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT 4 (Frederick M. Abbott ed. 1998).
60
See K.P.E. LASOK & D. LASOK, LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 14–
15 (7th ed. 2001); William A. Lovett, Current World Trade Agenda: GATT, Regionalism,
and Unresolved Asymmetry Problems, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 2001, 2009 (1994). This
remarkable success can be attributed to a variety of factors, including the United States’
Cold War paternalism and Europeans’ own desire for peace and solidarity. See, e.g., Fascal
Fontaine, A New Idea for Europe: The Schuman Declaration—1950–2000,
http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/eu_documentation/04/txt06_en.htm (last visited
Dec. 23, 2004). Most of all, the EC’s functional approach, which prioritized economic
matters over political ones, was certainly key to its success. The whole EC project originated
from a very functional, narrowly defined initiative, i.e., the “European Coal and Steel
Community” (“ECSC”) in 1951, under which Belgium, West Germany, Luxembourg,
France, Italy and the Netherlands cooperated and coordinated regarding their coal and steel
policies. See The History of the European Union, EUROPA (European Union Official
Website), http://europa.eu.int/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
61
United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can., Jan. 2, 1988, 102 Stat. 1851.
62
North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat.
2057. The U.S. aggressive change of course in its trade policies was also influenced by its
economic woes at that time, symbolized by the Twin Deficits as well as the lesser security
threat from the Soviet power. See Jagdish Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the
Reciprocitarians: US Trade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109 (1987); Ernesto M. Hizon,
Virtual Reality and Reality: The East Asian NICs and the Global Trading System, 5 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 81, 113 (1999) (observing that the relative decline of the U.S.
hegemony in the Eighties reduced its commitment toward the multilateral trading system). In
other words, the U.S. government was pressured to open foreign markets more aggressively
than before to better its economic situation in a post-hegemonic era when the United States
no longer needed to shoulder the burdens of upholding the multilateral trading system out of
security considerations.
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prominent regional coalition emerged. In 1994, Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay and Uruguay signed the Treaty of Ouro Preto to form
MERCOSUR.63
In Europe, the community building process of the E.C. was intensified
by a series of bold projects, such as the “Single European Act” (1986),
which subsequently paved the way to the European Union via the Treaty of
Maastricht (1992).64 Although a more economically integrated Europe
might be desirable for its Member States, the European Union earned the
derisive tag of the “Fortress” because of the difficulties that non-members
had in accessing the European markets.65 Even among Member States, such
an ambitious scale and pace of integration was not uncontroversial.
Margaret Thatcher, the then British Prime Minister, expressed Euroskepticism based on her liberal faith that increased interventionism and
corporatism on a European scale would be damaging to economic welfare
of individual Member States.66
The Asian-Pacific response to the Fortress Europe was the Asia Pacific
Economic Cooperation (“APEC”). In 1989, Australian Prime Minister
Robert Hawke proposed forming an economic cooperation forum in the
Asia Pacific region, modeled after the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).67 The subtle political message

63

Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a Common Market, March
26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/mrcsr/mrcsrtoc.asp.
Originally, the MERCOSUR planned to establish a common market between two major
South American economies, Brazil and Argentina, when it was first announced in 1990. See
Thomas Andrew O’Keefe, An Analysis of the MERCOSUR Economic Integration Project
from a Legal Perspective, 28 INT’L LAW. 439, 439 (1994). Yet, this plan soon drew two
neighboring economies, Uruguay and Paraguay, toward it because these countries
understandably feared that their smaller economies would suffer enormously should they be
excluded from the common market.
64
Jacques Delors, the then President of the European Commission, explained that: “the
Single Act means, in a few words, the commitment of implementing simultaneously the
great market without frontiers, more economic and social cohesion, an European research
and technology policy, the strengthening of the European Monetary System, the beginning of
a European social area and significant actions in environment.” Juan Carlos Ocaña, The
History of the European Union: the European Citizenship, http://www.historiasiglo20.org/
europe/acta.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
65
See Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition?: Standardization and Regional
Integration under Article XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 459, 462 (2003).
66
Ocaña, supra note 64.
67
See Merit E. Janow, Assessing APEC’s Role in Economic Integration in the AsiaPacific Region, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 947, 953 (1997). In 1993, U.S. President Clinton
upgraded the APEC meeting from the ministerial level to the presidential level by hosting
the Economic Leaders’ Meeting. This embrace departed from U.S. policy under the previous
administration. The United States’ new stance ushered in an era of economic cooperation in
the region while the UR negotiations came to a close. Although some ASEAN members
were suspicious of the U.S. initiative to promote aggressive liberalization in the region, other
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to the global trading community was that the Asia Pacific region might
transform itself into another regional trading bloc like the E.C. and
NAFTA, if the UR negotiation collapsed.68
Although regionalism became a more salient phenomenon during the
Eighties, it did not deter the launch of the long-awaited multilateral trade
organization, the WTO. Regional options at that time functioned mostly as
an “insurance policy” in the event of failure of the multilateral trade
negotiations.69 Furthermore, as was seen in the case of APEC, certain
regional initiatives espoused the WTO’s multilateral agenda, thereby aiding
in its creation.70 In sum, the original equilibrium between regionalism and
globalism envisioned under GATT was maintained.
D. The Equilibrium Broken: Neo-Regionalism (1995–Present)
The long-held equilibrium between regionalism and globalism has
recently been broken. Regionalism has now begun to impact the
multilateral trading system in unprecedented ways that are clearly
distinguishable from past trends. Recent symptoms of the broken
equilibrium may be captured by the label of “Neo-Regionalism,” which is

members—in particular Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—persuaded them to follow the
United States lead out of pragmatic considerations. See Martin Rudner, Institutional
Approaches to Regional Trade and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area, 4 TRANSNAT’L L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 168–69 (1994).
68
See Janow, supra note 67, at 953. APEC’s original membership consisted of Australia,
Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the United States. China (1991), Taiwan
(1991), Hong Kong (1991), Mexico (1993), Papua New Guinea (1993), Chile (1994), Peru
(1998), Vietnam (1998), and Russia (1998) subsequently joined the organization. APEC,
Member Economies, http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/member_economies.html (last visited
Feb. 11, 2005). From the outset, APEC’s institutional posture was circumspect. APEC
cautiously configured its institutional place vis-à-vis pre-existing organizations whose
jurisdictions might conflict with its own. APEC officially pursued harmony and even
complementarity with these organizations, rather than competing for dominance. For
instance, APEC avoided estranging ASEAN by recognizing ASEAN’s importance to APEC.
Joint Statement of the First Ministerial Meeting (Canberra, Australia, Nov. 6–7, 1989),
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1989_1st_apec_m
inisterial.html.
69
WTO, Development, Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading System, at 1,
http://www.wto.org/wto/develop/regional.htm (last visited Mar. 26, 2005).
70
Id. APEC repeatedly expressed its strong commitment to the multilateral trading
system and the UR negotiation process. In particular, in the “APEC Seoul Declaration,”
APEC members defined APEC’s institutional rationale as “open regionalism”—i.e.,
economic cooperation in Asia Pacific in the spirit of the multilateral trading system. Joint
Statement of the Third Ministerial Meeting (Seoul, Korea, Nov. 12–14, 1991),
http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1991_3th_apec_
ministerial.html. See generally C. Fred Bergsten, Open Regionalism, 20 WORLD ECON. 545,
548 (1997).
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characterized by an intense proliferation and profligacy of regional trading
blocs.71 More RTAs have been created during a decade under the WTO
than during the half-century existence of GATT. Out of 300 RTAs extant
as of October 2004, 176 RTAs were created since the launch of the WTO in
1995.72 The WTO Secretariat aptly epitomized this trend:
The number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) being negotiated
has increased exponentially and their scope as well as their
geographical reach have both broadened and expanded. The
resilience of this trend is likely to intensify further as the few
remaining countries traditionally favouring multilateral-only trade
liberalization have initiated―or are actively considering―
negotiations of several RTAs.73

More alarming than the sheer increase in the number of RTAs is the
fact that the new RTAs are unaffected by the WTO-compatibility test under
GATT Article XXIV. The apparently draconian GATT Article XXIV has
proven to be a paper tiger. Very few RTAs have undergone serious
scrutiny under the Article, nor has a single RTA been rejected under the
Article. The WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agreements (“CRTA”),
whose function is to determine whether an RTA satisfies all the
requirements under the Article, has been quite ineffective in providing any
meaningful discipline or practical guidelines.74 Under Neo-Regionalism,
the CRTA often fails to issue even a “factual examination” report over a
certain RTA in question.75 Both the Article’s ambiguous language and the
political priority placed on forming RTAs have contributed to this lack of
legal discipline.76 This “legal vacuum” has allowed the rapid unchecked
increase of RTAs.
Certain analytical tools may help further understanding of the decisive
political dynamics behind the broken equilibrium between globalism and
regionalism. The first tool is the “Unilateralist” lens, which symbolizes the
recent U.S. penchant for bilateralism over multilateralism.77 The second
71

See WTO Secretariat, Regional Trade Integration Under Transformation (Apr. 26,
2002), http://192.91.247.23/english/tratop_e/region_e/sem_april02_e/clemens_boone
kamp.doc [hereinafter WTO, Under Transformation].
72
CB Report, supra note 6, at 21.
73
WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 3 (emphasis added).
74
Id. at 12.
75
Id. at 13.
76
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 436–37.
77
This proclivity for bilateralism/regionalism can also be seen in the United States’
transatlantic neighbor, the European Union. The European Union is negotiating a “EuroMediterranean FTA” under the “Barcelona Process,” “Economic Partnership Agreements”
with African and Caribbean countries, and even FTAs with Middle East and South American
countries. See AARON COSBEY ET AL., THE RUSH TO REGIONALISM: SUSTAINABLE
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tool is the “Reactionary” lens, which signifies reactions to such
Unilateralism by the U.S. trading partners. The third tool is the
“Expansionist” lens, which describes pre-existing RTAs’ desires to expand
membership.
Unilateralism, in this article, refers to the persistent departure of the
United States from an MFN-based multilateral trading forum in favor of a
preferential bilateral (regional) trade deal. In fact, such demultilateralization began during the period of the old GATT. Jagdish
Bhagwati aptly criticized the United States “FTA-cum-301 selfish hegemon
strategy,” under which the United States acts as a hub that wrings
advantageous terms from its bilateral free trade agreement (“FTA”) spokes
through aggressive unilateralism.78 For example, under NAFTA, the United
States extracted advantageous terms from Mexico in a “one-on-one”
bargain on intellectual property protection.79
Yet, what differentiates Neo-Regionalism from the NAFTA
phenomenon is the level of intensity in the regionalist policy of the United
States. In recent years, the United States has been relentless in its pursuit of
an unprecedented number of bilateral trade deals. The United States has
already completed bilateral FTA deals with Jordan (October 24, 2000),
Singapore (May 6, 2003), Chile (June 6, 2003), Australia (May 18, 2004),
Central American countries (the Central American Free Trade Agreement
(“CAFTA”) includes Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua) (May 28, 2004), Morocco (June 15,
2004), and Bahrain (September 14, 2004). The United States is currently
negotiating similar deals with Panama, Andean countries (Peru, Colombia,
Bolivia, and Ecuador), Malaysia, Oman, Korea, Thailand, United Arab
Emirates, and the Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) members.80
The United States proclaimed its bilateralist bias when it expressed its
frustration at the collapse of the WTO Ministerial Conference held in
Cancún in September 2003. The U.S. Trade Representative (“USTR”)
Robert Zoellick announced that the United States would pursue bilateral
trade agreements with “can do” countries, leaving behind “won’t do”

DEVELOPMENT AND REGIONAL/BILATERAL APPROACHES TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT
LIBERALIZATION 3 (2004), available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/trade_rush_region.pdf.
78
JAGDISH BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS: UNSETTLING REFLECTIONS ON TRADE,
IMMIGRATION AND DEMOCRACY 309 (1998) [hereinafter BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF
WINDOWS]. Section 301 refers to the U.S. statute which authorizes the U.S. government to
impose sanctions against foreign trading partners in case of their breach of international
trade law or any other unreasonable trade practices which harm the U.S. trade interests. 19
U.S.C. §§ 2411–2420 (2000).
79
BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS, supra note 78, at 311 n.11.
80
USTR, Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/
Section_Index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).

55

DEFRAGMENTINGWORLDTRADE

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

6/11/2007 10:15:23 AM

27:39 (2006)

countries.81 In the same context, U.S. Senator Charles Grassley, Chairman
of the Senate Finance Committee, proclaimed that the United States has a
lot of “options” including bilateral trade negotiations.82
Recent U.S. unilateralist trade policies have provoked reactionary
moves among its trading partners, especially in East Asian countries. This
brings us to the second analytical tool: the “Reactionary” lens. Heads of
East Asian economies have recently announced a number of ambitious
blueprints for bilateral or sub-regional trade agreements. Some of these
agreements have been concluded and have already borne fruit.83 Even
Japan and Korea, which were traditionally called “Friends of GATT Article
I (MFN),”84 departed from their long-standing tradition of having no RTAs
by signing an FTA with Singapore on January 13, 2002,85 and with Chile on
February 15, 2003.86 Under the alleged “domino effect,”87 ASEAN has also
been active in creating sub-regional trade agreements with Northeast Asian
trading partners (“ASEAN plus Three”) as well as with Australia and New
Zealand (“ASEAN-AUS/NZ”), and with China (“ASEAN-China”).88
While motivations behind this unparalleled regionalist zeal in East
Asia vary, including a centripetal posture after the recent financial crisis,89
and the emergence of China as a new economic superpower,90 defensive
81
Robert B. Zoellick, Op-Ed., America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-Do Countries, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2003, at 23.
82
The Office of the US Senator Charles Grassley, Memorandum: Collapse of Trade
Negotiations in Cancún (Sep. 14, 2003), http://grassley.senate.gov/index.cfm?Fuse
Action=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=3582&Month=9&Year=2003.
83
See
generally
APEC,
Member
Economies’
FTA/RTA
Information,
http://www.apec.org/webapps/fta_rta_information.html (last visited Dec. 27, 2004)
(providing an overview of current developments on RTAs/FTAs in East Asia and Asia
Pacific).
84
SCOLLAY & GILBERT, supra note 24, at 4.
85
See Larry Jagan, Japan Opens Its Markets, BBC NEWS, Jan. 14, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/1759915.stm.
86
See Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the Republic of Chile,
available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/Chi-SKorea_e/ChiKoreaind_e.asp.
87
See SCOLLAY, supra note 8, at 7.
88
See ASEAN Looks to Deepen Integration, Forge New Trade Ties, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEWS DIG., Sept. 8, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-0908/BRIDGESWeekly8-29.pdf.
89
See Won-Mok Choi, Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Prospect and
Jurisprudence, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 49, 49–50 (2003).
90
For the last decade, China’s increasing presence in East Asia, and in the world, and its
growing prowess as a trading powerhouse has been nothing short of phenomenal. Its size and
volume, both as an exporter and an importer in the region, is unsurpassed. China’s rise has
been both welcomed and feared by neighboring East Asian countries—depending on the
perspectives those countries hold. Some worry about China’s dominance in the region while
others want to gain preferential access to China’s huge market ahead of others, utilizing the
first-mover advantage. These various calculations and motivations lead different countries to

56

DEFRAGMENTINGWORLDTRADE

6/11/2007 10:15:23 AM

Defragmenting World Trade
27:39 (2006)

reactions to the FTA policies of the United States are still a critical factor.91
The United States’ recent aggressive bilateral/regional drive worldwide has
put East Asian trading partners in a protective position. These countries are
left few other options but to follow suit—without considering the long-term
costs and benefits—merely to avoid getting left behind. One Asian
commentator warned that “China hasn’t replaced the [United States]. But
it’s eating away at America’s influence. This is going to keep happening
unless Washington changes its ways.”92 This “reactionary regionalism”93
among East Asian trading nations is reminiscent of a futile proposal in the
early Nineties by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad to create
an “East Asia Economic Grouping” (“EAEG”) or an “East Asia Economic
Caucus” (“EAEC”).94 Although this emerging regionalism in East Asia
may have been merely reactionary, it still impacts multilateralism
negatively. The unenthusiastic participation in the recent WTO Hong Kong
Ministerial Conference by major East Asian nations, such as China, Japan,
and Korea, might be connected to the contemporary regionalist distraction
in this region.95
The third analytical tool is an “Expansionist” lens. One characteristic
feature of Neo-Regionalism is its ever-expanding geographical reach. Prechoose different partners in their commitments to RTAs. See Jeffrey Robertson, ASEAN Plus
Three: Towards the World’s Largest Free Trade Agreement?, Australian Dep’t. of
Parliamentary Library, Research Note 2002–03, No. 19, Nov. 12, 2002,
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/RN/2002-03/03rn19.htm.
91
See Mari Pangestu & Sudarshan Gooptu, New Regionalism: Options for East Asia, in
EAST ASIA INTEGRATES: A TRADE POLICY AGENDA FOR SHARED GROWTH 39, 40–41 (Kathie
Krumm & Homi Kharas eds., 2004). See also East Asian Trade: Everybody’s Doing It,
ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2004, at 39–40.
92
Carlyle A. Thayer, ASEAN Ten Plus Three: An Evolving East Asian Community?, in 2
COMPARATIVE CONNECTIONS: AN E-JOURNAL ON EAST ASIAN BILATERAL RELATIONS 52
(2001), http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/0004q.pdf.
93
See generally Beeson, supra note 56. See also East Asian Trade: Everybody’s Doing
It, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2004, at 39–40. A similar phenomenon can be located in the
creation of APEC in that it could be viewed as a reaction, or a warning, to emerging regional
blocs at that time, such as the European Union and NAFTA. See generally Sungjoon Cho,
Rethinking APEC: A New Experiment for a Post-Modern Institutional Arrangement, in WTO
AND EAST ASIA: NEW PERSPECTIVES, 381, 386–87 (Mitsuo Matsushita & Dukgeun Ahn eds.,
2004) [hereinafter Cho, Rethinking APEC].
94
See Beeson, supra note 56, at 17. But see Simon S. C. Tay, Asia and the United States
after 9/11: Primacy and Partnership in the Pacific, 28-WTR FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 113,
127 (2004) (predicating that this reactionary regionalism would not undermine pre-existing
bilateral relations between individual countries in East Asia and the United States.).
95
See Raphael Minder & Richard McGregor, Asian Nations Stick to Sidelines, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005, at 8 (reporting that China’s government resources had been diverted to
its increasing regional trade deals before the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial Conference);
Philip Bowring, Op-Ed., Silver Lining in WTO Talks, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Dec. 19, 2005,
at 9 (observing that East Asia’s recent regional policies reflected illusions that regionalism
can be a substitute for the WTO).
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existing RTAs tend to become mega-RTAs by adding new members (e.g.,
E.U. enlargement) or by merging with other RTAs96 (e.g., Free Trade
Agreement of the Americas (“FTAA”),97 E.U.-MERCOSUR FTA).98
Interestingly, however, such ambitious expansionist initiatives have
exposed ironic limitations of the regionalist approach. Unlike simpler
bilateral FTA projects, it has become harder to coordinate conflicting
interests among an increased number of members under mega-RTAs.
For instance, there has been a good deal of internal conflict within the
enlarged European Union over the new service directive, which is mainly
due to old (developed) members’ lukewarm attitudes toward new
(developing) members’ cost advantages in low-skilled labor in the service
sector.99 In another instance, the refusal of the United States and European
Union to decrease farm subsidies stalemated the current FTAA initiative
and the E.U.-MERCOSUR FTA deal, respectively. It appears that the big
players are reluctant to make any concessions in agricultural protection to
fellow RTA members for strategic reasons―in particular, to save
bargaining chips for the WTO Doha Round negotiations.100
In sum, Neo-Regionalism, which differs from regionalism under
GATT in its intensity and profligacy, is characterized by the Unilateralist
departure of the United States from the multilateral trade forum; a
Reactionary emulation among the trading partners of the United States,
especially East Asian nations, and the counterproductive Expansionist zeal
of pre-existing RTAs.

96
See William H. Lash, The Decline of the Nation State in International Trade and
Investment, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1011, 1012 (1996) (observing a growing tendency to
“merge” among trade blocs).
97
See generally Jose Antonio Rivas-Campo & Rafael Tiago Juk Benke, FTAA
Negotiations: Short Overview, 6 J. INT’L ECON. L. 661, 662–66 (2003) (describing the
history of FTAA negotiations).
98
See The E.U.’s Relation with MERCOSUR, EUROPEAN UNION COMMISSION OF
EXTERNAL RELATIONS, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/mercosur/intro/ (last
visited Jan. 2, 2006).
99
See Wolfgang Munchau, Comment, Missed Chances to Revive Europe’s Economy,
FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at 15.
100
See More Jaw-Jaw: MERCOSUR and the E.U., ECONOMIST, Oct. 30, 2004, at 44;
FTAA Talks at an Impasse, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Apr. 8, 2004, at 9–10,
available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/04-04-08/BRIDGESWeekly8-13.pdf; FTAA: USBrazil Standoff Dims Prospects for Miami Ministerial, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.,
Oct. 8, 2003, at 4, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/03-10-08/BRIDGESWeekly733.pdf; Much Wind and Little Light: Trade in the Americas, ECONOMIST, Oct. 18, 2003, at
36; Jeffrey Schott, Unlocking the Benefits of World Trade, ECONOMIST, Nov. 1, 2003, at 66;
Rivas-Campo & Benke, supra note 97, at 669. See also, SCOLLAY, supra note 8, at 4.

58

DEFRAGMENTINGWORLDTRADE

6/11/2007 10:15:23 AM

Defragmenting World Trade
27:39 (2006)

III. ASSESSING THE BROKEN EQUILIBRIUM: THE
FRAGMENTATION OF WORLD TRADE
A. Methodology of Investigation
1. The Telos of World Trade as an Investigatory Criterion
Assessing the impact of the broken equilibrium between regionalism
and globalism, i.e., regionalist fragmentation, is a daunting task, especially
when such a task is grounded on an “empirical” investigation. Trade
statistics and other information on RTAs are often difficult to collect.101
Even if the data were available, different interpretations of the same data
could lead to different assessments of RTAs. Perhaps the inconsistency in
interpreting data attests to economists’ diverging views on regionalism.102
Yet, a more serious caveat of conducting an empirical study would be its
incapability in showing the cumulative, interrelated effects of existing
RTAs on world trade.
This article does not pursue an empirical approach to analyzing the
effect of regionalism on world trade. Instead, it adopts a “normative”
methodology that predicates its assessment on the very objective and
purpose (telos) of the multilateral trading system. The telos not only
functions as a decisive means of interpreting trade rules, but it is also a
criterion with which to appraise the normativity of various trade (or trade
related) phenomena, such as regionalism, and their effects. However, the
WTO’s telos is dynamic and evolving; therefore, understanding the telos of
the multilateral trading system necessitates a review of the system’s
institutional transformation throughout its history.
2. The Tripartite Telos from Three Constitutional Moments
The first constitutional moment of the modern multilateral trading
system was the creation of GATT in 1947. GATT was one of the pillars of
the Bretton Woods arrangement developed by the Allies as a post-war
international economic order. GATT incorporated painful lessons learned
from the mutually destructive economic balkanization during the inter-war
period that contributed to WWII. Unsurprisingly, GATT aimed to
“liberalize” international trade through reducing tariffs, quotas, and other
trade barriers.103 GATT was a great success: international trade increased
101
See WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 13 (observing that “dispute
settlement awareness” discourages members of regional trading blocs from coming forward
with information on their regional policies which might be inconsistent with the WTO rules).
102
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 434–35 (regarding empirical debates
among economists on the effect of regionalism).
103
See GATT, supra note 4, pmbl.
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enormously,104 which allowed once poor countries to trade their way out of
abject poverty.105
As GATT rounds of tariff reduction negotiations continued,
conventional trade barriers, such as tariffs and quotas, declined
substantially.106 At the same time, GATT contracting parties began to enact
increasingly domestic regulations that emphasized the quality of life in
areas of environment, human health, and human safety.107 However,
GATT’s “pro-trade” bias,108 i.e., its staunch commitment to trade
liberalization, made it ill-equipped to deal with these domestic regulatory
changes because such welfare regulations inevitably result in trade
restrictions, especially in the highly interdependent world.109 Uruguay
Round negotiations (1986–1994) addressed these new concerns, which
eventually led to the creation of the WTO in 1995.
The launch of the WTO is the second constitutional moment of the
modern multilateral trading system. The WTO has overcome GATT’s protrade bias by responding more effectively to the aforementioned new
For instance, “rights” to regulate were explicitly
challenges.110
acknowledged in side agreements, such as the Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS”) and the

104

During the period of 1965 to 1999, an average annual growth rate of gross domestic
product (“GDP”) marks 4.2% in the low and middle income countries and 3.2% in the high
income countries; during the same period, an average annual growth rate of export of goods
and services marks 5.3% and 5.9%, respectively. THE WORLD BANK, 2001 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS 24–27 (2002).
105
See, e.g., THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD (Lee-Jay
Cho & Yoon Hyung Kim eds., 2000).
106
“Regulatory régimes have been brought into greater interaction, as the removal of
direct barriers to the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs/quotas and exchange
controls) has shifted attention towards regulatory difference as a barrier to entry of
commodities or capital.” Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction Between
Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC REGULATION
IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89, 89 (William Bratton et al. eds., 1996).
107
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal, The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 364–65 (2004).
108
See Hannes L. Schloemann & Stefan Ohlhoff, “Constitutionalization” and Dispute
Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 424,
451 (1999).
109
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89–90 (Gary Burtless et al.
eds., 1998).
110
Cf. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, The Transformation of the World Trading System
Through the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L
161, 189 (1995) (arguing that the 1994 WTO Agreement “completes the original design of
the Bretton Woods system,” and “reduces the existing fragmentation of international
economic law, by a ‘global integration law’ for international movements of goods, services,
persons, investments and payments”).
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Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”). Therefore, the telos of
the WTO overcame the narrow anti-protectionist agenda of GATT by
embracing a much broader range of matters relating to “integration” and
“sustainable development.”111 Thus, the WTO presents a more mature
approach toward the dual objectives of free trade and regulatory autonomy.
Despite the advances made by the WTO, it has not been able to
improve the economic welfare of poor people and nations. While certain
trading nations, particularly the traditional North and the New Globalizers
(e.g., China and India), have profited from the WTO system, many poor
countries have failed to benefit from the multilateral trading system.112
Ironically, the global income gap has actually grown faster since the
creation of the WTO.113 Disappointment over this situation contributed to
the collapse of the 1999 WTO Ministerial Meeting in Seattle,114 and finally
led to the establishment of the “Development Round” in Doha in 2001,
which focused on development and poverty issues in trade negotiations.115
The Doha Development Round represents the third constitutional moment
of the modern multilateral trading system.
In conclusion, these three constitutional moments collectively
constitute the telos of the current global trading system―a tripartite
objective of free trade, adequate regulation and development.

111
WTO Agreement, supra note 5, pmbl. Professor Cottier also notes “while the GATT
was an agreement the purpose of which was almost exclusively the reduction of trade
barriers, the WTO increasingly assumes constitutional functions in a globalizing economy.”
Thomas Cottier, The WTO and Environmental Law: Some Issues and Ideas, (Trade &
Development Centre Essay Series), available at http://web.archive.org/web/2004050203101
9/http://www.itd.org/issues/essay1.htm (emphasis added). Cf. Brian F. Fitzgerald, TradeBased Constitutionalism: The Framework for Universalizing Substantive International
Law?, 5 U. MIAMI Y. B. INT’L L. 111, 129 (1996–97) (arguing that “[t]he Uruguay Round of
the GATT has presented us with a trade structure that no longer seeks only to deregulate or
regulate in the name of some narrow universal principle of free trade, but that seeks to
regulate sovereignties for the purpose of finding universality.”).
112
See United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, para. 5, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares55
2e.pdf (“For while globalization offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very
unevenly shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed.”).
113
See, e.g., Global Gap Rising, World Bank Study Shows, UN WIRE, Jan. 18, 2002,
available at http://www.unwire.org/unwire/20020118/23173_story.asp.
114
See generally, Sylvia Ostry, Making Sense of It All: A Post-Mortem on the Meaning
of Seattle, in SEATTLE, THE WTO, AND THE FUTURE OF THE MULTILATERAL TRADING SYSTEM
81 (Roger B. Porter & Pierre Sauvé eds., 2000).
115
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 20 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/
mindecl_e.htm.
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B. Investigating Fragmentation: Three Teleological Failures
1. Trade Failure
Under the Vinerian test, an RTA may be justified if effects of trade
creation exceed those of trade diversion. In other words, even though the
outside world may suffer in the short-term from trade-diverting effects of an
RTA, it “can gain in the long-run only as the result of the general diffusion
of the increased prosperity” of the RTA.116 However, this pre-formation
presumption which provides the rationale of GATT Article XXIV has been
put to test by empirical studies which focus on post-formation effects of
RTAs. Economists generally believe that RTAs are inherently inferior in
trade creation to a multilateral trading system. For instance, Glenn Harrison
demonstrated that multilateral trade liberalization results in significantly
larger gains to world trade creation than the network of RTAs.117 This
broad observation also reverberates in studies on particular RTAs. In
analyzing the trade impact of MERCOSUR, Alexander Yeats noted that
because RTA members often trade with each other in goods in which they
have little comparative advantage, RTAs detrimentally impact members and
non-members alike.118 In a similar vein, John Romalis revealed that while
NAFTA augmented North American output and boosted prices in many
well-shielded sectors by excluding non-members’ imports, it eventually
failed to create a significant welfare effect on non-members.119
Global welfare loss is even more prominent when RTAs exclude major
products from their coverage, such as agricultural products and textiles.
RTAs usually do not address the “tariff peaks” in major products, nor do
they usually adopt a “comprehensive” mode of liberalization of these

116

VINER, supra note 46, at 44.
GLENN W. HARRISON ET AL., RULES OF THUMB FOR EVALUATING PREFERENTIAL
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
ASSESSMENTS 3 (World Bank Development Research Group, WPS 3149, 2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=30278.
118
Alexander J. Yeats, Does Mercosur’s Trade Performance Raise Concerns about the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?, 12 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 1, 1 (1998),
available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/journals/wber/revjan98/pdf/article1.pdf.
See also GLENN W. HARRISON ET AL., REGIONAL, MULTILATERAL, AND UNILATERAL TRADE
POLICIES OF MERCUSOR FOR GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN BRAZIL 32 (World
Bank Development Research
Group, WPS 3051, 2003), available at
http://econ.worldbank.org/view.php?type=5&id=26556 (estimating that multilateral trade
liberalization of 50% tariff reduction would provide worldwide gains tantamount to four
times the benefits of either FTAA or E.U.-MERCUSOR).
119
JOHN ROMALIS, NAFTA’S AND CUSFTA’S IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1
(National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11059, 2005), available at
http://nber.org/papers/w11059.
117
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products.120 For instance, while trade creation might outweigh trade
diversion in manufactured products121 under the E.C., its overall
contribution to global welfare is questionable in the face of the notorious
“Common Agricultural Policy”122 which blatantly shelters European
farmers from foreign competition. Also, under MERCOSUR, “industrial
realpolitik” in Argentina and Brazil blocked the introduction of fully
liberalized trade in the auto industry, despite a strong shift to economic
liberalization.123
This trade failure, i.e., global welfare loss due to serious trade
diversion and sector specific protectionism, can be traced back to old RTAs,
such as NAFTA and MERCOSUR. However, such trade failure under
GATT was more anecdotal than systemic. It certainly did not lead to
serious fragmentation of world trade since the original equilibrium could be
maintained with a relatively small number of RTAs. It is through
expansion of pre-existing RTAs and propagation of countless RTAs under
Neo-Regionalism that trade failure has become a persistent pattern and thus
begun to seriously compartmentalize global trade.
Trade failure under Neo-Regionalism is likely to be most prominent in
politically sensitive products that have long been sheltered from foreign
competition. For instance, when Turkey formed a customs union with the
E.C. in 1996, Turkey was forced to adopt the E.C.’s common external trade
policies, which required Turkey to introduce new quotas on imports of
textiles and clothing products, diverting trade from non-E.C. members.124
Likewise, on May 1, 2004, the new Member States of the European
Union—Poland, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Hungary,
Malta, Cyprus, Slovenia and Slovakia—began to apply an E.U. quota on
imports of textiles and clothing from certain countries.125 The net result
from an expansion of a pre-existing RTA, i.e., the European Union, was
enormous trade diversion of potential trade flows from non-member
countries to member countries.
More often than not, these sensitive products are also carved out from
120

See WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 10.
POMFRET, supra note 27, at 267 (quoting PETER ROBSON, THE ECONOMICS OF
INTERNATIONAL INTEGRATION 200 (2d ed. 1984)).
122
Id. at 268.
123
Stephen P. Sorensen, Open Regionalism or Old-Fashioned Protectionism?: A Look at
the Performance of MERCOSUR’s Auto Industry, 30 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 371, 398
(1998).
124
Appellate Body Report, Turkey—Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/DS34/AB/R (Oct. 22, 1999), available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/
reports/wtoab/turkey-textiles(ab).pdf [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Turkish QRs].
125
E.U., Notice to Importers: Imports into the Community of Textile and Clothing
Products After 1 May 2004 Following the Enlargement 2004 O.J. (C 68/08), available at
http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/textiles/documents/204.pdf.
121
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the scope of trade liberalization under RTAs. This frustrating practice of
targeted omission has become a hallmark of Neo-Regionalism. The JapanSingapore FTA (2003) excluded numerous agricultural and textile products
from its reach.126 Both the U.S.–Australia FTA (2004) and the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA”) (2004) do not cover sugar.127
Omissions have not been limited to traditional commodities. The MexicoJapan FTA (2004) left out, inter alia, automobile maintenance services,
business services, construction, entertainment, and telecommunication, in
addition to traditional sectors such as agriculture, forestry, fisheries, and
livestock.128 Such typical proclivity of RTAs toward omitting politically
sensitive sectors and focusing on “less risky” businesses further “cement[s]
domestic constituencies” which resist liberalization and reform, and thus
discourage those sectors from being discussed and negotiated in the
multilateral forum.129 In other words, RTAs not only “failed to crack the
hardest nuts”130 but also further hardened them.
Even if certain products are included in the coverage of RTA, and thus
are subject to duty-free access, the convoluted nature of RTAs’ “rules of
origin” hinders trade creation―the full materialization of improved market
access from RTAs. Rules of origin refer to domestic regulations that
determine the origin of imported products.131 An RTA needs rules of origin

126

See Choi, supra note 89, at 52.
See U.S.—Australia Free Trade Pact Omits Sugar, Increases Transparency on
Pharmaceuticals, 21 INT’L TRADE REP. 260 (Feb. 12, 2004); Five Get Anxious; Central
America Trade, ECONOMIST, May 29, 2004, at 38.
128
Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican States for the Strengthening of the
Economic
Partnership,
Japan-Mex.,
Sept.
17,
2004,
available
at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/JPN_MEXDraftEPA_e/JPN_MEXind_e.asp
[hereinafter
Mexico-Japan FTA].
129
Id. at 10.
130
OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 19.
131
Rules of origin are necessary for differentiating, or discriminating, among competitive
imports. See Moshe Hirsch, Rules of Origin as Trade or Foreign Policy Instruments? The
European Union Policy on Products Manufactured in the Settlements in the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 572, 574–76 (2003). Of course, we would not need
rules of origin if we accorded equal treatment to all imported goods. In the United States,
products freely pass over various states’ borders without needing to demonstrate their origins
(e.g., made in Illinois). Yet, in the realm of international trade, trading nations still need rules
of origin either to selectively benefit other trading partners, as with preferential tariffs
(preferential rules of origin); or, to selectively penalize them, as with antidumping measures
(non-preferential rules of origin). The former type of rules of origin is critical to forming and
maintaining RTAs: in order to maintain preferences, RTAs must prevent “trade deflection.”
WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 10. Trade deflection occurs when nonoriginating goods from non-members enjoy a free ride (duty-free access) to RTA members’
markets. In other words, preferential rules of origin are a “screening” mechanism for RTAs
to determine which originating goods from members are entitled to preferential treatment.
See Paul Brenton, Rules of Origin in Free Trade Agreements, WORLD BANK TRADE NOTE 1,
127
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from its very nature because preferential tariffs and other treatment are
accorded exclusively to products from member countries (originating
goods). Complex rules of origin would not be necessary if every product
was 100% made in a certain country. However, because manufacturing
processes are often spread over multiple nations, it is daunting to attribute a
finished good to any one nation.132
If an RTA has liberal rules of origin, more products are regarded as
originating goods and thus entitled to preferential treatment. However, if an
RTA has strict rules of origin, more products are denied preferential
treatment in the regional market. The latter scenario panders to local
protectionism while deepening trade diversion. Unfortunately, recent RTAs
follow the latter scenario. For example, the recent Japan-Thailand FTA
deal did not resolve acrimony over rules of origin on Thai food and
agricultural products. Thailand, as one of the world’s largest tuna canners,
wants Thai tuna can exports to Japan to benefit from low preferential tariffs,
while Japan wants to apply those low tariffs only to those tuna cans made
directly out of tuna harvested in Thailand.133 If the Japan’s position
prevails, foreign tuna exports to Thailand will be diverted, and Thailand’s
tuna canning manufacture may suffer, while Japanese tuna canners and tuna
producers may be protected. Likewise, the Mexico-Japan FTA introduced
over 100 pages of new rules of origin under the title of the “Annex 4
referred to in Chapter 4: Specific Rules of Origin.” 134 These labyrinthine
rules cover nearly all the products ranging from food to automobiles.
Beyond protectionism, these voluminous and complicated rules of
origin also impose enormous transaction costs and administrative burdens
even to those businesses within the bloc. Although these rules of origin are
often “hidden by a facade of technical and seemingly innocuous details,”135
those devilish details often harass businesses and overburden the customs
offices.136 For example, many U.S. importers elect not to fill out certificates
of NAFTA origin because of the burdensome paperwork and the fear of

NO. 4, May 29, 2003, available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/
Resources/TradeNote4.pdf.
132
See Joseph A. LaNasa, III, Rules of Origin and the Uruguay Round’s Effectiveness in
Harmonizing and Regulating Them, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 625, 629–34 (1996) (regarding
various determinants of origin such as the “last substantial transformation” and the “valueadded percentage”).
133
Amy Kazmin, Questions Remain After Thai-Japan Trade Deal Agreed, FIN. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2005, at 5.
134
Mexico-Japan FTA, supra note 128, ch. 4.
135
Lan Cao, Corporate and Product Identity in the Postnational Economy: Rethinking
U.S. Trade Laws, 90 CAL. L. REV. 401, 410 (2002).
136
See, e.g., WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 11; OECD, REGIONALISM,
supra note 7, at 19; Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of
Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT’L L. 539, 580–81 (1995).
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being penalized for filing an improper claim.137 Instead, these importers
volunteer to pay tariffs that ostensibly should not have been levied on the
products being imported. Similarly, despite the existence of duty free
access provided by free trade agreements between the European Union and
Eastern European countries, many clothing products made in those
countries enter into the European market under an alternative customs
procedure. The main reason for the alternative procedure is the costs and
uncertainties in proving the origins of Eastern European imports.138 This
disarray of rules of origin, which is often dubbed the “spaghetti bowl,”139 is
only exacerbated as more RTAs are added to the landscape of the global
marketplace.
Unfortunately, the WTO’s response to this trade failure has been
mostly ineffective. First of all, although GATT Article XXIV governs the
formation of RTAs via its ostensibly draconian requirements, it has not
demonstrated any real bite, mostly because of its arcane language. Nor has
the CRTA been capable of determining the WTO-legality of individual
RTAs brought to the WTO Secretariat for review. No RTA has ever been
rejected for violating Article XXIV. This “legal vacuum” further invites
proliferation of RTAs.140 Likewise, while the WTO Agreement on Rules of
Origin attempts to harmonize “non-preferential” rules of origin,141 it does
not address “preferential” rules of origin which structure RTAs. Without
any multilateral discipline in administering preferential rules of origin,
RTAs can effectively divert imports from non-member countries by
manipulating rules of origin, thereby becoming fortress-like economic
blocs. Given the increased proliferation rate of RTAs, this fortress effect
seriously fragments world trade.
Nonetheless, some scholars attempt to rationalize RTAs under the
euphemistic banner of “competitive regionalism.”142 For instance, Fred
Bergsten believes that the current U.S. bilateral/regional drive “place[s]

137
See Tim Tatsuji Shimazaki, Proof of Origin as a Trade Barrier, reprinted in NAFTA
PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 65–66 (RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE
GORDON, & DAVID LOPEZ) (2000).
138
See Brenton, supra note 131, at 5.
139
BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS, supra note 78, at 290.
140
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 435–43.
141
Agreement on Rules of Origin, Annex 1 A, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, art. 1,
para. 2 (“Rules of origin referred to in paragraph 1 shall include all rules of origin used in
non-preferential commercial policy instruments, such as in the application of most-favourednation treatment under Articles I, II, III, XI and XIII of GATT 1994; anti-dumping and
countervailing duties under Article VI of GATT 1994; safeguard measures under Article
XIX of GATT 1994; origin marking requirements under Article IX of GATT 1994; and any
discriminatory quantitative restrictions or tariff quotas.”).
142
See Alvin Hilaire & Yongzheng Yang, The United States and the New
Regionalism/Bilateralism, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 603, 608 (2004).
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pressure on non-members of individual free trade agreements to join the
group itself or to conclude broader agreement[s].”143 This position, no
matter how plausible it may sound at first blush, fails to recognize that such
regionalism at the same time deprives WTO members of the incentives and
resources required to promote the multilateral trading system. In particular,
trading nations are likely to delay certain liberalization plans, keeping them
as “bargaining chips” for future bilateral/regional deals.144 Moreover, this
competition may pit one bloc against another and precipitate further
economic balkanization.145 In other words, such a rationalization neglects
the “high-risk” of competitive protectionism, which has already been
observed in the reactionary regionalism of East Asia.146 Even if we accept
that competitive regionalism could lead to competitive trade liberalization
in theory, as a practical matter, this is still unlikely to transpire. According
to one study, APEC would require as many as 210 FTAs just to encompass
all of its 21 members’ bilateral trading relationships.147
In sum, without multilateral disciplines, RTAs’ “embedded
mercantilism,”148 together with their intricate rules of origin, produce tradediverting effects vis-à-vis the rest of the world. The myriad of RTAs
enacted under Neo-Regionalism principles, most of which are left
unchecked by the multilateral norms, cause trade diversion, fragment world
trade, severely undermine the MFN-based WTO system, and eventually
lead to an inefficient allocation of global resources.
2. Regulatory Failure
The recent RTAs usually contain chapters on social regulations, such
as human health, labor, and the environment. However, these social
provisions are often inconsistent with multilateral rules in their regulatory
scope and level.149 For instance, in the area of food safety, RTAs more
readily “bow” to individual members’ regulatory preferences.150
Unsurprisingly, the large number of these regional social charters in

143

Fred Bergsten, A Competitive Approach to Free Trade, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at

13.
144

See SCOLLAY, supra note 8, at 4.
See FRANKEL, supra note 27, at 210.
146
See supra Parts II:D.; see also Hilaire & Yang, supra note 142, at 608; Bernard K.
Gordon, A High-Risk Trade Policy, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 105, 108–18 (2003).
147
See SCOLLAY, supra note 8, at 8.
148
Beeson, supra note 56, at 10.
149
Id. at 4.
150
See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 26; see generally Grant E. Isaac, Food Safety
and Eco-Labeling Regulations: A Case of Transatlantic Regulatory Regionalism?, in
REGIONALISM, MULTILATERALISM, AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: THE RECENT EXPERIENCE
227–52 (Gary P. Sampson & Stephen Woolcock eds., 2003).
145
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different RTAs precipitates global regulatory morass. Although RTAs may
act as regulatory laboratories under certain circumstances,151 absent a
multilateralizing process, divergent regulations among RTAs may also
create regulatory clashes.152 To wit, a “subfield consolidation,” in which
“larger, but still uncoordinated regionalized bumper cars will carom
around” the international arena, dampens prospects of multilateral
regulatory convergence.153 This “regulatory gridlock” under the web of
RTAs complicates any multilateral efforts to establish a consistent and
coherent regulatory norm, yet at the same time has serious implementation
problems of its own.154
A closer examination of social charters in recent RTAs reinforces the
fear of this regulatory divergence and/or regulatory clash. For instance, the
U.S.-Jordan FTA includes provisions hinting at a linkage between trade and
labor,155 which may be inconsistent with the regulatory consensus that the
WTO Members have already reached in this area. At the Singapore
Ministerial Conference in 1996, the WTO Members announced that labor
issues should be addressed by the International Labor Organization
(“ILO”), and not be abused for protectionist purposes. They reiterated this
position at the Doha Ministerial Conference in 2001.156 In the area of
intellectual property rights, the U.S.–Jordan FTA explicitly overrides the
Trade-Related Aspects Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) by
stipulating that any marketing approval of pharmaceutical products should
151
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 454–57 (discussing “open regionalism”
in APEC).
152
Michael Malloy employed a “bumper car” model to highlight the potential risk of
regulatory clash between different jurisdictions. Michael P. Malloy, Bumper Cars: Themes
of Convergence in International Regulation, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S21–22 (1992)
(arguing that without a multilateralized solution in some important regulatory areas (e.g.,
banking regulation) backed by a strong force, regulatory convergence still remains
prospective, “leav[ing] us with a stultifying pattern of subfield consolidation in which larger,
but still uncoordinated, regionalized bumper cars will carom around the internationalized
area of financial services.”).
153
Id.; cf. Joost Pauwelyn, Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a
Universe of Inter-Connected Islands, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 903, 904 (2004) (warning against
“self-contained islands of international law, de-linked from other branches of international
law” due to regulatory fragmentation).
154
WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 12 n.36.
155
U.S.–Jordan Joint Statement on WTO Issues, Oct. 24, 2000, available at
http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/us-jrd/WTOISS.asp (“4. The Parties support the participation
of the World Trade Organization in discussions concerning the relationship between the
rights of workers and international trade.”).
156
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 13 December 1996,
WT/MIN(96)/DEC, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/
wtodec_e.htm; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/1, para. 8, available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_
e/mindecl_e.htm .
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conform to the FTA, not the TRIPS.157
FTA supremacy in this field may undermine the WTO’s laboriously
reached multilateral regulatory consensus, considering that WTO Members
have adopted a series of special regulations under TRIPS to give the poor
better access to certain pharmaceutical products.158 RTA “templates,”159
which may be inconsistent with WTO rules and policies, impede regulatory
harmonization through more functionally competent international
regulatory agencies (or conventions), such as the ILO and numerous
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (“MEAs”). Moreover, fragmented
rule-making resulting from RTA templates diverts political capital, public
attention, and other negotiating resources from the multilateral process.160
Worse, the cost of such diversion is disproportionately borne by poor
countries with little means.161
Markedly, this regulatory failure can be considered yet another trade
failure because regulatory fragmentation or heterogeneity itself is a trade
barrier in the global context. Producers from non-member countries must
bear additional compliance costs when exporting to RTA markets with
disparate regulations.162 More often than not, such regulatory barriers
completely block non-members’ market access. For instance, U.S. soybean
producers who employ certain biotechnology skills in their production may
not be able to export their products to the European Union because of the
European Union’s different regulations on genetically modified foods.163

157

Charlene Barshefsky, USTR, Side Letter on Marketing Approval of Pharmaceutical
Products, Oct. 24, 2000, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/us-jrd/letter1.asp.
158
See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2001) [hereinafter Declaration on
TRIPS]; World Trade Organization, Ministerial Implementation-Related Issues and
Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17, 41 I.L.M. 757 (2002); World Trade Organization Council for
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of Paragraph 11 of
the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005);
World Trade Organization General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2, 2003) (adopted
Aug. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Implementation 6].
159
CB Report, supra note 6, at 23.
160
See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Multilateralism and
Regionalism: The New Interface, Chapter II: Remarks by Mr. Francisco Thompson-Flôres,
at 24, UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2004/7 (2005), available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/
ditctncd20047ch2_en.pdf.
161
Hilaire & Yang, supra note 142, at 608 (2004).
162
See OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 17; see also Mallet & Fifield, supra note 2
(quoting Michael Ducker).
163
See Request for the Establishment of a Panel by the United States, European
Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/23 (Aug. 8, 2003).
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GATT Article XXIV once again fails to remedy this situation. First,
since the Article only concerns the “formation” of RTAs, most social
charters and regulations which are created after the formation are therefore
outside of the Article’s jurisdiction.164 Second, even if the Article, in
particular paragraph 5, were applied to post-formation regulations, it would
be a daunting, if not impossible, task to “quantify” the precise traderestrictiveness of these regional regulatory schemes on an ex ante basis, to
determine whether they constitute an undue burden to non-members.165
Third, Article XXIV is silent on whether an entire RTA should be void
when a regulatory scheme fails to meet the Article’s requirements.166 The
weaknesses of the Article contribute to the proliferation of social charters in
RTAs.
In sum, various regional regulatory templates under RTAs often
contradict regulatory consensus established in the multilateral setting. The
proliferation of these regulatory templates and resultant regulatory
fragmentation also complicate global regulatory harmonization and thus
severely hinders global trade. It is more apt to describe these titular “WTOplus” RTAs as having a “WTO-minus” impact on the multilateral trading
system.167 The recent emergence of “cross-regional” RTAs has only
increased the intensity of this fragmentation, which adds yet another layer
of complexity to the existing regulatory heterogeneity.168
3. Development Failure
The proliferation of RTAs aggravates the developmental disparity of
trading nations, including uneven distribution of benefits from free trade. In
general, large regional blocs, such as the European Union, may increase
their internal welfare, but impoverish smaller non-members and widen the
164

See GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV, para. 2(b), at 270 (“Provided that the duties and
other regulations of commerce imposed by, or any margin of preference maintained by, any
such union or agreement in respect of trade with other contracting parties shall not on the
whole be higher or more stringent than the average level of the duties and regulations of
commerce or margins of preference applicable in the constituent territories prior to the
formation of such union or the adoption of such agreement” (second and third emphases
added)).
165
Id. (“Provided that the duties and other regulations of commerce imposed by, or any
margin of preference maintained by, any such union or agreement in respect of trade with
other contracting parties shall not on the whole be higher or more stringent than the average
level of the duties and regulations of commerce or margins of preference applicable in the
constituent territories prior to the formation of such union or the adoption of such
agreement” (second, third and fourth emphases added)).
166
See GATT, supra note 4, art. XXIV, at 268–72.
167
See generally CB Report, supra note 6, at 23.
168
See WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 8; see also WTO Committee on
Regional Trade Agreements [WTO-CRTA], Note by the Secretariat: Mapping of Regional
Trade Agreements, WTO-CRTA Doc. WT/REG/W/41 (Oct. 11, 2000).
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gap between rich and poor countries.169 According to Ben Zissimos and
David Vines, bloc expansion creates a “terms of trade” gain for the bloc
members at the expense of non-members, especially smaller ones.170 In
other words, while members of large blocs can enhance their economic
welfare through a deeper internal integration and resultant economies of
scale, smaller non-member economies’ exports to these blocs are
continuously threatened by these artificial terms-of-trade gains by large
blocs.
Additionally, small, poor trading nations may still suffer even as
members of RTAs with large, rich nations. The “hub and spoke” model
provides a powerful tool with which to analyze development failure of
North-South RTAs. A hub (a large, rich country) can enjoy free access to
the spokes’ (small, poor countries’) markets to the benefit of its export
industries, while at the same time benefiting its import industries by
providing access to the spokes’ cheap raw materials.171 However, the
spokes cannot benefit in the same way, unless they form a web of RTAs (a
“rim”) amongst themselves.172 Even if the spokes can experience an initial
improvement in market access to the hub, such benefits tend to evaporate
when multilateral trade liberalization subsequently lowers trade barriers.173
Also, the spokes, not the hub, suffer most welfare loss due to the exclusion
of important sectors, such as agriculture, from the North-South RTAs.174
Alvin Hilaire and Yongzheng Yang demonstrated that the exclusion of
agricultural liberalization from the U.S.-Chile FTA resulted in substantial
welfare loss to Chile, with no major negative impact on the United States.175
Dominique van der Mensbrugghe, Richard Newfarmer, and Martha
Denisse Pierola confirmed through an economic model the existence of this
developmentally pernicious effect of the recent trend of bilateral deals
between North and South.176 Using the Global Trade Analysis Project
database, they performed a simulation based on a hypothesis that all

169

Ben Zissimos & David Vines, Is the WTO’s Article XXIV a Free Trade Barrier?
passim (Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, CSGR Working Paper
No. 49/00, 2000), available at http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/research/
workingpapers/2000/wp4900.pdf.
170
Id. at 33.
171
See, e.g., Garcia, supra note 136, at 557–58.
172
Id.
173
See Hilaire & Yang, supra note 142, at 622.
174
Id.
175
Id. at 613 tbl.3, 617–18, 619 tbl.5.
176
DOMINIQUE VAN DER MENSBRUGGHE, RICHARD NEWFARMER AND MARTHA DENISSE
PIEROLA, Regionalism vs. Multilateralism?, in TRADE, DOHA, AND DEVELOPMENT: WINDOW
INTO THE ISSUES 313,
313 (Richard Newfarmer ed., 2005), available at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/TRADE/0,,contentMDK:207323
99~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:239071,00.html.
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developing countries would sign bilateral trade agreements with rich
countries, such as the United States, the European Union, Japan, and
Canada.177 The result was truly revealing. While multilateral trade
liberalization would bring developing countries a gain of 109 billion dollars
in 2015, bilateral deals with rich countries would cause them a loss of
twenty-two billion dollars in the same year.178 Moreover, such loss would
be concentrated disproportionately on low income countries (nineteen
billion dollars) over middle income countries (2.6 billion dollars).179
More seriously, however, parties to hub-and-spoke FTAs are
vulnerable to exploitation due to an inherent power disparity between
parties.180 Jagdish Bhagwati once criticized the “FTA-cum-301 selfish
hegemon strategy” of the United States, which positions the United States
as a hub that extracts far superior terms from its bilateral FTA spokes.181
This selfish hegemony is engineered by the aggressive unilateralism
embedded in Section 301,182 which was enacted to remedy allegedly unfair
trade practices adopted by foreign countries and thus protect commercial
interests of domestic producers.183 Leftist development theorists might
agree with Bhagwati’s criticism. The “dependency theory” casts a gloomy
vision over free trade initiatives, such as FTAs.184 It contends that a
“center” (powerful country) exploits “peripheries” (less powerful trading
partners).185 It was in this context that the World Social Forum held in
Porto Alegre, Brazil in January 2005 sounded a warning of immiserizing
effects of these North-South RTAs. Some participants, including the Africa
Trade Network (“ATN”), argued that the ongoing “Economic Partnership
Agreement (“EPA”)” negotiations between the European Union and
African, Pacific, and Caribbean countries demand far deeper concessions
from the poor than would otherwise be required under the WTO.186 The
177

Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316, 317 tbl.1.
179
Id. at 317 tbl.1.
180
Mario E. Carranza observed that the United States would want to restore its hegemony
in the Western hemisphere through a NAFTA-style FTAA in order to “compensate the
relative decline of its position in the world economy.” Mario E. Carranza, MERCOSUR, The
Free Trade Area of the Americas, and the Future of U.S. Hegemony in Latin America, 27
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1029, 1034 (2004). James Petras portrayed such U.S. position as an
“imperial project.” Id.
181
BHAGWATI, A STREAM OF WINDOWS, supra note 78, at 309.
182
See id.
183
See generally Trade Act of 1974 §§ 301–310 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§
2411–31 (2000)).
184
See generally JAMES M. CYPHER & JAMES L. DIETZ, THE PROCESS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 189–96 (1997).
185
Id.; see also RICHARD PEET, THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT 107–11 (1999).
186
See FTAs Lambasted at World Social Forum, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Feb.
2, 2005, at 5.
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ATN used the World Social Forum to advance the “Stop EPA Campaign,”
which it operates along with other non-governmental organizations
(“NGOs”) including Oxfam International, Action Aid, and the Third World
Network.187
Recent debates over public health crises vis-à-vis protection of
intellectual property rights of pharmaceutical products have further
illustrated the social welfare cost to poor countries inflicted by RTAs
mushrooming under Neo-Regionalism. This hegemonic strategy has
generated enormous profits for the pharmaceutical industry, in part by
forcing the poor to pay high prices for drugs.188 This deplorable
phenomenon stems from the RTAs’ departure from the multilateral norms.
Although the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (“TRIPS”) does protect basic intellectual property rights
over various drugs, the TRIPS nonetheless provides certain exceptions for
“compulsory licensing,”189 allowing WTO members to produce generic
versions of patented drugs without consent of the patent holders should
members face national health emergencies.190 Nonetheless, compulsory
licensing is an empty gesture to the world’s poorest countries because they
have no capability to produce those generics.191 Therefore, a new rule had
to be created so that the least developed counties are allowed to import
generics from other countries.192
Despite this need, certain countries have attempted to water down
these pro-development commitments through backdoor deals under
RTAs.193 For instance, in a recent spate of bilateral RTAs the United States
has effectively handed down a five-year shield from generic competition to
big pharmaceutical companies by prohibiting generic producers from using
pre-existing safety testing data and instead requiring them to conduct very
costly tests themselves before getting approval.194 In addition, the U.S.-

187

Id.
See, e.g., Larry Elliott & Charlotte Denny, U.S. Wrecks Cheap Drugs Deal, THE
GUARDIAN, Dec. 21, 2002, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/aids/story/0,,864087,00.
html.
189
See World Trade Organization, Frequently Asked Questions about TRIPS in the WTO:
Does the Agreement Allow Compulsory Licensing of Patents?, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/trips_e/tripfq_e.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
190
The Doha Ministerial Meeting reiterated this exception. See Declaration on TRIPS,
supra note 158.
191
See Implementation 6, supra note 158.
192
Id.
193
See, e.g., Carsten Fink & Patrick Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual
Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade Agreements, WORLD BANK TRADE NOTE, Feb.
7, 2005, at 1–4 (documenting the TRIPS-plus protection of intellectual property rights under
the recent U.S. FTA deals).
194
See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 6; see, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing.,
188
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Morocco FTA incorporates a controversial “ever-greening” clause that
extends the patent life of existing drugs if there is a “new use” for those
drugs.195 This overprotection of the pharmaceutical industry beyond TRIPS
discourages the production of generic drugs and eventually limits the poor
from accessing these drugs.
In an open letter to USTR, Robert Zoellick, on October 15, 2003 from
Doctors without Borders, raised similar concerns over intellectual property
provisions under the CAFTA draft. He argued that these TRIPS-plus
provisions might inflict “needless suffering and death” on patients with
HIV/AIDS and other diseases in the region.196 In the same line, Paul Hunt,
the U.N. Human Rights Rapporteur, has warned that the U.S. bilateral trade
talks with Andean countries might conflict with the United States’
international obligations by keeping drug prices unaffordably high for poor
people.197 The United Nations even implied that the lack of affordability
created under bilateral RTAs might constitute human rights violations.198
The criticism against these RTAs was intensified when Thailand hosted the
International AIDS Conference in July 2004. At the conference, reports
circulated that the recent U.S-Thailand bilateral trade negotiations
threatened to disband the Thai AIDS program in favor of a TRIPS-plus
intellectual property rights regime.199 French President Jacque Chirac even
labeled such bilateral pressure as “blackmail.”200
However, the United States is not alone in its proclivity for pursuing
art. 16.8, ¶ 1, May 6, 2003, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/USASingapore/USASingind_e.asp (last visited Sept. 13, 2006) (“If a Party requires the
submission of information concerning the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical or
agricultural chemical product prior to permitting the marketing of such product, the Party
shall not permit third parties not having the consent of the party providing the information to
market the same or a similar product on the basis of the approval granted to the party
submitting such information for a period of at least five years from the date of approval for a
pharmaceutical product and ten years from the date of approval for an agricultural chemical
product.”).
195
See COSBEY ET AL., supra note 77, at 6–7; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art.
15.9, ¶ 2, Jun. 15, 2004, available at http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/USMoroccoFinalFTA_e/USMorindfinal_e.asp (“In addition, the Parties confirm that patents
shall be available for any new uses or methods of using a known product, including new uses
of a known product for the treatment of humans and animals.”).
196
Open Letter from Nicolas de Torrente, Executive Dir. of Doctors Without Borders
United States, & Luis Villa, Head of Mission for Doctors Without Borders Guatemala, to
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick (Oct. 15, 2003), available at
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/openletters/tozoellick_10-15-2003.htm.
197
See Concerns Raised over Access to Medicines Under Trade Treaties, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., July 14, 2004, at 4.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
France Raps ‘US Aids Blackmail,’ BBC NEWS, Jul. 13, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/health/3891385.stm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006).
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TRIPS-plus RTAs with developing countries.
In the recent FTA
negotiation with the SACU, the European Free Trade Association
(“EFTA”) pressured SACU to accept certain TRIPS-plus provisions on
public health.201 The proposal included measures, such as a “five- to tenyear data protection period for clinical test data” and “five-year patent
extensions to brand-name drugs.”202 SACU rejected these measures, just as
it rejected similar measures from the United States in a separate FTA
negotiation, on the ground that it would jeopardize poor African countries’
access to essential medicines.203
In sum, considering that most recent RTAs follow the foregoing huband-spoke model,204 development failure under Neo-Regionalism is more
alarming than previously perceived.
IV. RESTORING THE EQUILIBRIUM: DEFRAGMENTING WORLD
TRADE
A. Defragmentation as Multilateralization
To restore the original equilibrium between globalism and regionalism,
the currently fragmented global trading system should be defragmented.
Yet, defragmentation does not mean undoing those RTAs formed under
Neo-Regionalism. Such an option would be neither feasible nor desirable
considering the vast political attraction to RTAs as well as their potential
contributions to the multilateral trading system. Therefore, defragmentation
should aim to bring back the original theme of regionalism under GATT,
i.e., complementarity. In other words, defragmentation should project
multilateral disciplines to unchecked RTAs so that they can facilitate, not
substitute, the multilateral trade and trade-related activities. This strategy,
which may be labeled as “multilateralization,” seeks to mend three
teleological failures caused by fragmentation―trade, regulatory, and
development failure―by restraining divergent and discriminatory aspects
of RTAs.
The multilateralization strategy includes an institutional approach,
201

See Southern African Countries Reject ‘TRIPS-Plus’ Demands in FTA Negotiation,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Mar. 9, 2005, at 4.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 5.
204
See WTO, Under Transformation, supra note 71, at 5. After the fall of the fifth WTO
Ministerial Conference in Cancún on September 2003, the United States unreservedly
revealed its intention for hub-and-spoke bilateral deals by announcing that if “won’t do”
countries obstruct multilateral talks, it would proceed with “can do” countries. Robert B.
Zoellick, Op.-Ed., America Will Not Wait for the Won’t-Do Countries, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 22,
2003, at 23; see also Agriculture: G-20 Group Discusses Way Ahead; Colombia, Peru Leave
Alliance, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Oct. 8, 2003, at 1–2.
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which involves various arrangements under the WTO, as well as a judicial
approach which utilizes the WTO’s jurisprudential power.
B. Institutional Defragmentation
1. Open Regionalism
One multilateralization strategy is to sensitize RTAs to the multilateral
trading system by breaking their insulating structure. This “opening” of
regionalism begins with the softening of the RTAs’ exclusive institutional
nature so that RTAs’ activities are better connected to the multilateral
domain.205 The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (“APEC”) is a case in
point.206
APEC’s most distinguishing feature is its soft institutionalism.207
APEC did not result from a formal treaty, nor does it have a formal charter
or constitution.208 It has no formal decision-making apparatus or disputesettlement mechanism.209 Commitments made in APEC are not technically
binding and thus cannot be enforced.210 This informalism211 helps ease
political standoffs that would have resulted from formal structures. For
instance, China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan have all been able to attend APEC
meetings as independent members.212 In a similar context, APEC provided
the United States and China with a “non-confrontational” forum for various
policy discussions in the “post-Tiananmen” period.213
Yet, APEC’s institutional flexibility has contributed most to its
complementarity to the multilateral trading system. In stark contrast to
inward-looking, preferential regional blocs, APEC’s inclusive nature
creates multilateral space in which benefits from APEC members’ trade and
205

See Sang-Seung Yi, Endogenous Formation of Customs Unions Under Imperfect
Competition: Open Regionalism Is Good, 41 J. INT’L ECON. 153, 170–71 (1996).
206
See, e.g., Ali Alatas, Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, “ASEAN Plus
Three” Equals Peace and Prosperity, Address at the 2001 Regional Outlook Forum of the
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 3 (Jan. 5, 2001), available at
http://www.iseas.edu.sg/trends221.pdf (contending that “open regionalism” should be the
“operating principle” of the ASEAN plus Three, and that it should “complement,” not
supplant, APEC); cf. SCOLLAY & GILBERT, supra note 24, at 147–49 (discussing the
“[e]nduring [e]conomic [l]ogic of APEC”).
207
See generally Cho, Rethinking APEC, supra note 93, at 405–06.
208
Id.
209
Id.
210
Id.
211
See Lorraine C. Cardenas & Arpaporn Buranakanits, The Role of APEC in the
Achievement of Regional Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 49
passim (1999).
212
Cho, Rethinking APEC, supra note 93, at 406.
213
Janow, supra note 67, at 997–98.
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investment liberalization might be shared by non-members.214 In the
APEC, various voluntary, unilateral liberalization schemes can be
experimented among member countries (“mini-lateralism”).215
For
instance, under APEC, Japan and Singapore vowed to liberalize their
telecommunications markets; Japan allowed an increase in the number of
U.S. auto dealerships in Japan; China allowed foreigners to lease farmland;
and Korea opened its construction market to foreigners.216 Yet, what has
been rehearsed in APEC is eventually liberalized in the multilateral terrain.
In this context, a Chinese official once stated that “the WTO is like a lovely
banquet, and APEC is the kitchen where the food is prepared.”217 It was in
the same spirit of complementarity that APEC vigorously advocated the
WTO when the success of the UR negotiations and the creation of the WTO
were in doubt.218
APEC’s open regionalism has recently led to its redoubled efforts to
help multilateralize the current RTA trend in East Asia. Based on the firm
commitment to an open model, the APEC Business Advisory Council
(ABAC) has reaffirmed APEC’s prioritizing of the WTO over the recently
proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (“FTAAP”), which would
have created another inward-looking bloc.219 Moreover, in November
2004, APEC Ministers endorsed the “APEC Best Practices for RTAs,”
which emphasizes multilateral principles, such as WTO/APEC consistency,
transparency, simple rules of origin, open membership, and periodic

214

1994 Sixth Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC] Ministerial Meeting, Jakarta,
Indonesia, Nov. 11–12, 1994, Joint Statement, ¶ 60, available at http://www.apec
sec.org.sg/content/apec/ministerial_statements/annual_ministerial/1994_6th_apec_ministeria
l.html.
215
See Shara L. Aranoff, Regional Trade Organizations: Strengthening or Weakening
Global Trade?, 88 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 309, 312 (1994); Jonathan D. Aronson & Peter
F. Cowhey, Prospects for Post-Uruguay Round Trade Management, 4 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1994); see generally NORMAN D. PALMER, THE NEW REGIONALISM IN
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 175, 177–82 (1991).
216
Fischer, supra note 56, at 349.
217
JONATHAN T. FRIED, APEC as the Asia-Pacific Model for Regional Economic
Cooperation, in CHINA IN THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: DEFINING THE PRINCIPLES OF
ENGAGEMENT 183, 186 (Frederick M. Abbott ed., 1998) (quoting China’s Vice Minister
Long Yongtu).
218
Cho, Rethinking APEC, supra note 93, at 413–14 & n.138.
219
See Media Release, APEC Bus. Advisory Council, Senior Business Executives
Deliver Recommendations to APEC Leaders: Successful Conclusion of WTO Negotiations
Top Priority (Nov. 20, 2004), available at http://www.apec.org/apec/news___media/2004_
media_releases/201104_bizexecrecmdapecleaders.html; see also Fred Bergsten, Comment,
Plan B for World Trade: Go Regional, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at 13 (proposing the
FTAAP initiative as a Plan B to the moribund WTO Doha round talks); Sungjoon Cho,
Letter to Editor, “Plan B” Is Always Inferior to “Plan A”, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, at 10
(arguing that Bergsten “profoundly underestimates the demerits of regionalism”).

77

DEFRAGMENTINGWORLDTRADE

6/11/2007 10:15:23 AM

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:39 (2006)

review.220 To improve transparency, APEC Ministers also approved a new
“Reporting Template” that enables member economies to share information
on their RTAs.221 The Reporting Template is geared particularly toward
open regionalism in that it requires APEC Members to describe how their
RTAs complement their trade liberalization efforts under the WTO, and to
state when they should notify the WTO of their RTAs.222
Perhaps APEC could go even further by establishing a special task
force on trade regionalism that would monitor RTAs in the APEC region.
The guiding principle of such monitoring would be complementarity to the
WTO. Non-binding task force recommendations could help RTA parties
adjust their regional trade policies to conform to the multilateral trading
principles. The role of the task force mirrors that of GATT Article XXIV―
screening RTAs from a multilateral standpoint―yet it goes beyond the
Article’s capability in that it also monitors RTAs’ post-formation activities.
In sum, APEC’s experience with open regionalism provides an
effective defragmentation model.223 The APEC model, characterized by
flexibility and openness, can be employed in other RTAs. After a regional
rehearsal, trade and investment liberalization may then be multilateralized
on an MFN-basis to non-members. This open, non-discriminatory model
can avoid the welfare costs caused by a closed, discriminatory structure of
RTAs, thereby overcoming their trade failure. In particular, poor nonmember countries will enjoy, free from regional exclusivity, more and
better access to foreign markets, which in turn offers one of the best routes
to development.
2. Regulatory Convergence
Under the institutional equilibrium between the WTO and RTAs, the
latter may function as “test laboratories”224 in which members can
220
APEC, Best Practice for RTAs/FTAs in APEC, Doc. 2004/AMM/003 (Nov. 17–18,
2004), available at http://www.apec.org/apec/apec_groups/other_apec_groups/FTA_RTA.
html.
221
APEC, IAP Update Template on RTAs/FTAs, Doc. 2005/SOM3/040 (Sept. 13–14,
2005), available at http://www.apec.org/apec/documents_reports/senior_officials_meetings
/2005.html.
222
Id.
223
See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 10, at xi (viewing that open
regionalism would reduce exclusiveness of preferences structured in regional blocs); Germán
Creamer, Open Regionalism in the Andean Community: A Trade Flow Analysis, 2 WORLD
TRADE REV. 101 (2003) (showing that the Andean Free Trade Zone established in 1993 has
not reduced extra-region trade while increasing intra-region trade); cf. Sherry M.
Stephenson, Regional Versus Multilateral Liberalization of Services, 1 WORLD TRADE REV.
187, 208 (2002) (observing that regional services liberalization could be applied ‘de facto’
on an MFN basis and then multilateralized under the WTO system).
224
See John H. Jackson, Regional Trade Blocs and the GATT, 16 WORLD ECON. 121, 130
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experiment with various regulatory standards while not necessarily
undermining global regulatory coherence. However, when this equilibrium
is broken, these different regulations tend to create regulatory clashes
between one another.225 Therefore, multilateralization provides an adequate
level of regulatory convergence so that regulatory diversity remains at a
tolerable level.
Multilateral agreements under the WTO system, such as the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”) and the Agreement on
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (“SPS”), provide ample opportunities
to converge different regional standards in major areas, including human
health and safety. Interestingly, however, these agreements have focused
more on harmonizing procedure, rather than substance. Most obligations
stipulated in TBT and SPS, such as transparency,226 are designed to achieve
a “convergence in procedures” rather than a “convergence in particular
regulatory outcomes.”227
Nonetheless, a procedural convergence may not necessarily be
translated into a substantive convergence. While sharing the same
procedural disciplines, various standards under RTAs may still diverge in
their specific levels of regulatory protection. To harmonize these levels
may be far more burdensome than procedural harmonization under TBT or
SPS. To eliminate substantive regulatory divergence among RTAs may
require launching new harmonization treaties, which themselves have major
shortcomings, such as a tedious negotiation process228 and vague
outcomes.229
Yet, soft law, i.e., international standards (guidelines or

(1993); Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Markets of International Trade: A Perspective on the
Proposed United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, 12 YALE J. INT’L L. 193, 248
(1987).
225
See supra Part III.B.2.
226
See, e.g., Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
(SPS), Annex A1, the WTO Agreement, supra note 5, art. 7, Annex B, para. 5 [hereinafter
SPS]; Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Annex 1, the WTO Agreement,
supra note 5, arts. 2.5, 2.9, 5.2.2, 10 [hereinafter TBT].
227
David G. Victor, The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade
Organization: An Assessment after Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 865, 872
(2000).
228
See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Appraising the Launch and Functioning of the WTO, 39
GERMAN Y. B. INT’L L. 20, 39 (1996) (viewing that “[t]he decision-making and voting
procedures of the WTO, although much improved over the GATT, still leave much to be
desired. It is not clear how the consensus practice will proceed, particularly given the large
number of countries now or soon involved.”).
229
See, e.g., John H. Jackson, International Economic Law in Times That Are Interesting,
3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 8 (2000) (viewing that “[t]reaties are often an awkward albeit
necessary method of designing institutions needed in today’s interdependent world, but they
do not solve many problems.”).
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recommendations), can overcome these problems to a considerable degree.
International standards feature a more flexible rule-making process than
hard law (treaties) due to their non-binding nature.230 International
standards also provide more concrete regulatory referential points because
epistemic regulators, rather than diplomats, set the standards.231 Both TBT
and SPS expressly require WTO Members to use international standards as
a basis of their regulations.232 Likewise, both TBT and SPS provide
Members a critical incentive to use international standards, by establishing
a rebuttable presumption that regulations promulgated in accordance with
international standards do not pose an obstacle to international trade in
violation of WTO obligations.233 Furthermore, to encourage trans-

230

See Stephen Zamora, Is There Customary International Economic Law?, 32 GERMAN
Y. B. INT’L L. 9, 34–35 (1989) (discussing the “soft law” nature of customary international
economic law); Charles Lipson, Why Are Some International Agreements Informal?, 45
INT’L ORG. 495, 537–38 (1991) (documenting benefits of informal agreements over formal
treaties).
231
See notably Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6
EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 535 (1995); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Real New World Order, 76
FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184 (1997); ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, Governing the Global Economy
Through Government Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS
IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS & INTERNATIONAL LAW 178 (Michael Byers ed., 2000); see
also OECD, Regulatory Reform and International Standardization, Working Party of the
Trade Committee, TD/TC/WP(98)36/FINAL, 28–32 (1999) (discussing “regulators as
players in standardization”).
232
TBT, supra note 226, art. 2.4 (“Where technical regulations are required and relevant
international standards exist or their completion is imminent, Members shall use them, or the
relevant parts of them, as a basis for their technical regulations.”) (emphasis added); id. art.
2.6 (“With a view to harmonizing technical regulations on as wide a basis as possible,
Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the preparation by
appropriate international standardizing bodies of international standards for products for
which they either have adopted, or expect to adopt, technical regulations.”) (emphasis
added); SPS, supra note 226, art. 3.1 (“To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures
on as wide a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures
on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, where they exist.”) (emphasis
added); id. art. 3.4 (“Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in
the relevant international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the international and
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection
Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and periodic review of
standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and
phytosanitary measures.”) (emphasis added).
233
TBT, supra note 226, art. 2.5 (“Whenever a technical regulation is . . . in accordance
with relevant international standards, it shall be rebuttably presumed not to create an
unnecessary obstacle to international trade.”); SPS, supra note 226, art. 3.2 (“Sanitary or
phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this Agreement and of
GATT 1994.”).
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governmental cooperation on harmonization through international
standards, both TBT and SPS co-opt certain international regulatory
institutions that serve as shells for such cooperation, such as the
International Organization for Standardization,234 the International
Electrotechnical
Commission235
and
the
Codex
Alimentarius
236
Commission.
Considering that most RTA members are WTO Members at the same
time, anchoring their regional regulations to these international standards
achieves an adequate level of regulatory convergence while still retaining
enough regulatory leeway for regional customization. In fact, this
multilateralization strategy has already been employed by certain RTAs in
such regulatory areas as “trade facilitation,” i.e., simplification and
modernization of customs procedures. These RTAs base their customs
regulations on various multilateral rules and standards in this field, such as
the World Customs Organization (“WCO”), Kyoto Convention and the
WCO Arusha Declaration.237 RTAs based on common multilateral
regulatory anchors result in similar regional customs procedure
regulations.238
In a similar context, RTAs can function as regulatory platforms to
implement global standards. Recently, the North American Commission
for Environmental Cooperation (“CEC”), which is NAFTA’s environmental
arm, released a report titled “Implementing the Global Programme of
Action in North America.”239 The report contains recommendations on how
to effectively implement international protocols on environmental
protection, such as the “United Nations Global Programme of Action for
the Protection of the Marine Environment from Land Based Activities,”
(“GPA”) in North America.
The recommendations came from
environmental NGOs that conducted two pilot projects on this matter.240
By implementing global environmental standards like GPA in the regional
context, NAFTA can play a critical role in achieving multilateral regulatory
goals. APEC can also function as an active implementation platform for
multilateral regulatory norm. For instance, APEC’s Sub-Committee on
234
The International Organization for Standardization (ISO), What is ISO,
http://www.iso.org/iso/en/aboutiso/introduction/index.html#two (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
235
The International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC), Mission & Objectives,
http://www.iec.ch/about/mission-e.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
236
The Codex Alimentarius Commission, http://www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_
en.jsp (last visited Oct. 1, 2006).
237
Evdokia Moїsé, Trade Facilitation, in OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 92.
238
OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 16.
239
CEC, Implementing the Global Programme of Action in North America: Lessons
Learned from Two Pilot Projects, issued on Dec. 20, 2004, available at
http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/BIODIVERSITY/NALL-cam_en.pdf.
240
Id.
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Standards and Conformance expressly pursues the “broader adoption of,
and alignment with, international standards by APEC members” in
accordance with TBT and SPS.241 In this line, the Sub-Committee often
participates in the TBT meeting to present its regulatory programs to the
multilateral forum.242
The above-mentioned multilateralization strategies can be labeled as
positive harmonization in the sense that diverse regulations under RTAs are
adjusted towards common regulatory references such as international
standards. Yet, defragmentation can also be attained through a negative
mode of harmonization, i.e., “mutual recognition.” If each member of an
RTA recognizes other members’ different regulations as functionally
equivalent to its own regulations, such regulatory difference is no longer a
regulatory divergence which fragments their internal trade, but rather an
acceptable regulatory diversity which can coexist with free trade. If the
RTA also permits non-members to join such mutual recognition
arrangements and thus a recognition circle is widened, it even further
contributes to defragmentation of global trade. This “open recognition”
may be required under GATT Articles I and XXIV243 as it is under Article
VII of General Agreement on Trade in Services (“GATS”).244
In sum, potential and actual regulatory fragmentation which
proliferating RTAs inflict on the global trading community can be
mitigated, if not fully eradicated, through various multilateralization
strategies such as harmonization and open recognition. Therefore, this
regulatory convergence can restore the equilibrium disrupted by
fragmentation introduced by RTAs.
3. Monitoring and Surveillance of Multilateralization
The foregoing multilateralization strategy, i.e., open regionalism and
regulatory convergence, necessitates a certain mechanism within the WTO,
which effectively supervises and monitors RTA activities on a regular basis.
However, the WTO has not inherited any positive institutional tradition

241

APEC Sub-Committee on Standards and Conformance, 2003 Collective Action Plan,
available at http://www.apecsec.org.sg/apec/apec_groups/committees/committee_on_trade/
sub-committee_on_standards.downloadlinks.0005.LinkURL.Download.ver5.1.9 (last visited
Mar. 8, 2005).
242
Id.
243
See Trachtman, supra note 65, at 491.
244
General Agreement on Trade in Services, art. XXIV, Annex 1 B, WTO Agreement,
supra note 5; OECD, REGIONALISM, supra note 7, at 19; Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Joel P.
Trachtman, From Policed Regulation to Managed Recognition in GATS, in GATS 2000:
NEW DIRECTIONS IN SERVICES TRADE LIBERALIZATION 241, 276–77 (Pierre Sauve & Robert
M. Stern eds. 2000) (suggesting a requirement of “transitivity” under which hubs of mutual
recognition arrangements (MRAs) are required to merge different MRAs).
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from GATT in this matter. Although “working parties” were established
under the GATT system to examine the compatibility of RTAs with GATT
Article XXIV, their formation and operation was only on an ad hoc basis,
and served very little function beyond a mere talk shop. In nearly all cases,
those working parties failed to render clear conclusions on the legality of
RTAs under GATT and hence no legal disciplines.245 Unfortunately, the
current Committee of Regional Trade Agreements (“CRTA”) mirrors the
poor performance of GATT working parties. Created under the WTO as a
permanent institution with the same mandate as GATT working parties on
RTAs, CRTA’s operation has mostly been ineffective. A WTO Panel
observed that “[t]he Committee . . . has been unable to finalize reports on
any of these examinations. Progress in this regard was slowed, inter alia, by
disagreement among Members on the interpretation of certain elements of
those rules relating to RTAs, as well as on procedural aspects.”246
Facing an impasse under CRTA, the WTO needs a well-functioning
RTA monitoring and surveillance mechanism. The recent World Bank
report has also emphasized that more monitoring and exposure of
problematic RTAs would give excluded members the opportunity to
challenge them “in the court of public opinion.”247 In this regard, the Trade
Policy Review Mechanism (“TPRM”) seems to provide a powerful
model.248 Using peer pressure, TPRM functions as a surveillance
mechanism under which WTO Members discuss the WTO compatibility of
a wide spectrum of Members’ trade policies. TPRM also serves as a
dispute prevention mechanism by allowing members to discuss
controversial policies before they escalate into full blown disputes.
Therefore, WTO Members can monitor and supervise RTA activities under
TPRM in a discursive, rather than confrontational, format.
Admittedly, CRTA is not without any merits despite its prior
unsatisfactory operation. CRTA is still a significant depository of
knowledge and information on RTAs. To make the most of its resource
while achieving meaningful multilateral surveillance over RTA activities, a
CRTA-TPRM joint forum on RTAs may be conceived under the WTO.
This institutional innovation can enable WTO Members to effectively
manage and guide RTA behavior under the multilateral principles without
losing sight of potential merits of RTAs.

245

Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 435–43.
Appellate Body Report, Turkey―Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing
Products, WT/DS34/R, para. 2.7 (adopted Nov. 19, 1999).
247
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 10, at xiv.
248
See CB Report, supra note 6, at 27.
246
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C. Judicial Defragmentation
1. WTO Tribunal
Institutional defragmentation strategies demand political support for
their successful implementation because these strategies prescribe that
WTO Members create and operationalize a certain institutional apparatus.
Often, such institutionalization is accomplished by legislative action in the
WTO. Therefore, WTO Members must accumulate and spend political
capital in order to initiate or complete defragmentation projects. This may
limit the overall feasibility of an institutional approach, casting clouds over
the Doha Round agenda of “clarifying and improving” disciplines over
RTAs.249 Should the WTO tribunal (panels and the Appellate Body) play
an active role in defragmenting world trade, especially when Members fail
to act for political reasons?
As discussed above,250 inherent ambiguities of GATT Article XXIV
not only failed to render any legal discipline on the formation of RTAs but
also were exploited by regional members to form blocs which would not
have survived otherwise rigorous analyses under the Article. A GATT
panel refused to remedy these legal ambiguities through clear interpretation
of Article XXIV, relinquishing its jurisdiction over this issue on the basis of
what might be called the GATT version of the “political question”
doctrine.251 In the panel’s view, examination of RTAs was reserved for
contracting parties (GATT Members), not for itself.252 GATT Members
also failed to reach firm decisions on the legality of RTAs in nearly all
cases.253 More often than not, political stakes were too high to condemn a
certain RTA from an apolitical, i.e., legal, standpoint.
However, the new WTO system responded to this legal vacuum by
explicitly recognizing the role of the dispute settlement mechanism in
investigating GATT Article XXIV issues.
Paragraph 12 of the
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994
(Article XXIV Understanding) provides that any issues relating to GATT
Article XXIV, including the GATT-compatibility of an RTA, are
249
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
250
See supra Part III.B.1.
251
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 438.
252
European Community-Tariff Treatment on Imports of Citrus Products from Certain
Countries in the Mediterranean Region, L/5776, paras. 4.15–16 (unadopted, dated Feb. 7,
1985) (ruling that “examination―or re-examination―of Article XXIV agreements was the
responsibility of the CONTRACTING PARTIES” and that “it should, in the absence of a specific
mandate by the Council to the contrary, follow this practice also in the case before it and
therefore abstain from an overall examination of the bilateral agreements”).
253
See Cho, A New Perspective, supra note 11, at 436–37.
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reviewable under the WTO dispute settlement system.254 This is a critical
delegation by WTO Members to the (quasi-) judicial organ, i.e., the WTO
tribunal, in examining Article XXIV matters. Delegated to adjudicate “any
matters arising from the application” of Article XXIV, the WTO tribunal
now shares the RTA jurisdiction with the CRTA, at least concurrently, if
not exclusively. This comprehensive delegation reflects a collective
realization by WTO Members themselves regarding their political inertia
over RTA issues. In other words, they tied their political hands to the mast
of legalism by conferring the WTO tribunal an “enhanced role for a selfconfident judiciary.”255
This delegated power under the Article XXIV Understanding was
exercised for the first time in 1999. In Turkish Quantitative Restrictions
(“Turkish QRs”), India complained of Turkey’s imposition of new quotas
on India’s textile exports to Turkey.256 In defense, Turkey claimed that
Article XXIV justified its new quotas because those quotas were necessary
to establish a customs union with the European Union.257 According to
Turkey, it was forced to follow the E.U.’s quota system on India’s textile
exports in order to bring its customs policies into conformity with those of
the European Union in pursuit of Article XXIV, Paragraph 8. However, the
Appellate Body (“AB”) ruled that Turkey’s new quota system was not
necessary, and thus not justified under Article XXIV, because Turkey could
have pursued other reasonable alternatives, such as a system of certificates
of origin, which would allow the European Union to identify Indian exports
that move through Turkey.258 This system would allow Turkey to enjoy
free access to the European Union as a customs union member without
unduly restricting Indian exports to Turkey.
The Turkish QRs case is of great consequence in terms of
defragmentation. Critically, the AB anchored its analysis firmly to the
objective and purpose (telos) of RTAs in the WTO system which is
stipulated in Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article XXIV. The telos permits the

254

“The provisions of Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT 1994 as elaborated and applied
by the Dispute Settlement Understanding may be invoked with respect to any matters arising
from the application of those provisions of Article XXIV relating to customs unions, freetrade areas or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union or free-trade
area.” Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, WTO Agreement, supra note 5, Annex 1 A, para. 12 (emphasis
added).
255
See Philippe Sands, ‘Unilateralism’, Values, and International Law, 11 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 291, 301 (2000) (advocating the Appellate Body’s “enhanced role for a self-confident
judiciary, filling in the gaps which states in their legislative capacity have been unwilling―
or unable―to fill”).
256
Appellate Body Report, Turkish QRs, supra note 124.
257
Id. para. 17.
258
Id. para. 62.
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formation of an RTA only to the extent that it facilitates, not restricts,
global trade.259 This “complementarity” of regionalism to multilateralism
checks fragmentation of global trade by disallowing the introduction of new
trade restrictions vis-à-vis non-member countries under the excuse of selfcontained regionalism. This teleological interpretation by the AB pioneered
a new way in reviewing trade diversion from a judicial standpoint
regardless of a general compatibility of a specific RTA with Article XXIV.
It should be noted that the AB in the Turkish QRs did not address the
compatibility issue itself, which it viewed as an “economic” test.260 The
AB may not be in a good position to conduct such a test. Furthermore, even
if it could conduct the test it would be nearly impossible for the AB to
recommend that an RTA should be disassembled when the RTA failed the
test. Therefore, the AB can play a better role in defragmenting global trade
by striking down specific trade diversions, such as new import quotas in
this case, than by undertaking a Herculean task of examining a general
compatibility of RTAs with WTO norms.
In sum, the telos of regionalism within the WTO system, i.e.,
complementarity, is an ultimate criterion of judicial review on RTA
matters. This complementarity provides to RTAs not only the multilateral
discipline but also the “flexibility”261 under which they can be formed and
operate. Thus, complementarity is an indispensable fulcrum with which the
AB can mete out equilibrium between regionalism and multilateralism over
specific RTA measures. In this very context, the AB in Turkish QRs
criticized the panel for its failure to pay due attention to the telos in its
ruling, 262 although the AB reached the same conclusion as the panel.
2. Regional Trade Tribunal
Regional trade tribunals can also help avoid fragmentation of global
trade by interpreting RTA provisions coherently with the WTO rules. By
doing so, regional trade tribunals operate in the same normative force field
as the WTO tribunal because both tribunals use the common grammar and
syntax of free trade. NAFTA panels demonstrated this propitious
possibility a decade ago. In the Tariffication case,263 the United States
accused Canada of violating NAFTA rules when Canada increased its
tariffs on agricultural products. Canada justified this unusual tariff increase
under the “tariffication” mechanism of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,
259

Id. paras. 56–57.
Id. para. 55.
261
Id. para. 48.
262
Appellate Body Report, Turkish QRs, supra note 124, paras. 43, 64.
263
NAFTA―Tariffs Applied by Canada to Certain U.S.-Origin Agricultural Products,
CDA-95-2008-01 (Dec. 2, 1996), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/DISPUTE/nafta/
english/ca95081a.asp.
260
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which encourages Members to convert quantitative restrictions, i.e., quotas,
into less trade distorting trade barriers, i.e., tariffs.264 Based on a
teleological and holistic hermeneutics, a NAFTA panel under Chapter 20
unanimously upheld Canada’s otherwise technical violation of NAFTA
rules by emphasizing that NAFTA’s objective of trade liberalization should
accommodate, not defy, the WTO’s tariffication regime.265
More recently, in the 2005 Softwood Lumber case,266 a NAFTA
binational panel under Chapter 19 struck down the long-held “zeroing”
practice applied by the U.S. Commerce Department in antidumping
investigations, on the ground that the practice was inconsistent with WTO
norms. Zeroing refers to a specific methodology in calculating a general
dumping margin for a product in question under which negative individual
dumping margins are treated as zero before aggregating all individual
dumping margins.267 Although a U.S. court has upheld this practice,268 it
has been severely criticized by foreign trading partners because it inflates
dumping margins and thus makes it easier to find dumping.269 The WTO
AB has already condemned this practice.270 Invoking the celebrated
Charming Betsy doctrine,271 the NAFTA panel held that the zeroing practice
ran afoul of the U.S. international obligations under the WTO.272
These two NAFTA decisions eloquently demonstrate a harmonious
hermeneutics exercised by regional trade tribunals to prevent narrow
regional agendas from frustrating the multilateral trading system.
Accordingly, regional trade tribunals can contribute to defragmentation of
world trade by interpreting RTA provisions in a way that is consistent with
the WTO rules. To further develop such constructive interpretations,
regional trade tribunals might be permitted to request non-binding
“advisory opinions” from the WTO Appellate Body on issues interlacing
264

Id. paras. 59–60.
Id. paras. 167, 191–201.
266
NAFTA―Softwood Lumber Products from Canada, USA-CDA-2002-1904-2 (June
9, 2005) [hereinafter NAFTA Lumber].
267
See United States―Laws, Regulations and Methodology for Calculating Dumping
Margins (“Zeroing”), WT/DS294/R, para. 2.3 (Oct. 31, 2005).
268
See Corus Staal BV v. Dept. of Commerce, 395 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Timken
Co. v. United States, 354 F.3d 1334, 1343–44 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
269
See BRINK LINDSEY & DANIEL J. IKENSON, ANTIDUMPING EXPOSED: THE DEVILISH
DETAILS OF UNFAIR TRADE LAW 70–72 (2003).
270
See Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Anti-Dumping Duties on
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multilateralism and regionalism.
V. CONCLUSION
The global trading system has been severely fragmented by a surge of
formation of regional trading blocs. Such fragmentation short-circuits the
MFN-based multilateral trading system, as it did in the interwar era. In its
place, it instills an ethos of hostility273 which eventually threatens world
peace.274 If the current trend of regionalism grows unchecked, the global
trading community could degenerate into economic balkanization, as such
balkanization in the Thirties begot WWII. Multilateralism must be
reinstated, not only for the sake of international trade, but also for the more
profound purpose of global stability. Defragmenting the system requires
both institutional and judicial strategies. Regionalism will retain a place in
the global trading system, but it must not compromise the telos of the
multilateral trading system, which encompasses trade liberalization, global
regulation, and development. Therefore, any new configuration of regional
trading blocs in the global system should be a federalistic one that
guarantees a subtle constitutional balance between multilateral disciplines
and regional flexibility.
As the former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero emphasized,
regionalism and multilateralism can converge on the basis of “shared aims
and principles,” which leads eventually to “one free global market.”275
Defragmenting world trade is the key to this convergence.
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